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Executive Summary 
 
In 2010, Kentucky implemented a Performance Registration Information Systems and 
Management (PRISM) based automated ramp screening system (PARSS) at the Boone County 
inspection station on southbound I-71. The purpose of the PARSS is to identify and screen every 
vehicle that enters the Boone County inspection station.  The system provides automated 
screening of trucks based on the license plate number and the USDOT number displayed on the 
vehicle.  If it is determined that the vehicle should be stopped for inspection, that decision is 
communicated to the truck driver via the existing directional arrows that direct drivers to the 
static scale for inspection. The system installed at Boone County has the following components: 
 Two automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems (one from Perceptics and one from 
Hi-Tech Solutions (HTS)) that provide the license plate number from the front of the 
vehicle along with the state/jurisdiction.  FMCSA’s PRISM team required the installation 
of two different ALPRs for this project, to allow for a side-by-side comparison. 
 An automated USDOT number reader (USDOTR) (from HTS) that provides the USDOT 
number from the side of the vehicle. 
 A scene camera (from Perceptics) to capture a digital image of each passing vehicle for 
general description and visual identification purposes. 
 An interface to the existing weigh-in-motion (WIM) and truck sorting and tracking 
system (Mettler-Toledo), which directs trucks targeted for inspection to park. 
 A screening database containing national and state information pertaining to safety, 
registration, and credentials.  The database is updated daily, using data from Kentucky’s 
Clearinghouse and Commercial Vehicle Information Exchange Window (CVIEW). 
Safety and Fitness Electronic Records (SAFER) provides (via Kentucky’s CVIEW) the 
PRISM status and the Federal Out-of-Service (FOOS) status of the motor carrier.   
 The system is connected to a computer in the inspection station. An integrated user 
interface (developed by Cadre5) allows enforcement personnel to observe the system 
operation and to interact with the system as necessary.  
As the vehicle enters the inspection station and progresses along the ramp, it is tracked using 
loops in the pavement.  Images of the vehicle and the vehicle’s weight are collected on the ramp, 
and the identifying information is automatically decoded from the images and utilized with the 
screening database.  The PARSS checks several elements on the carrier and vehicle level to see 
if any potential safety, registration, or credential problems exist.  Only vehicles that fail the 
screening test are directed (by the system) to stop.   
 
x 
 
While the system is designed to operate automatically, it also allows for enforcement personnel 
to monitor and interact with the system. Specifically, when ALPR/USDOT information is 
displayed, enforcement personnel have the ability to check the optical character recognition 
(OCR) results against photographs displayed on the user interface and make on-the-fly 
corrections. If corrections are made on the user interface, the truck is rescreened based on the 
corrected data.  
 
A thorough evaluation was conducted to assess the performance of the system (i.e., does it do 
what it was intended to do?), the value of the system in identifying vehicles for inspection with 
PRISM or CVISN-related issues, and the potential for more widespread deployment of this type 
of screening system.  In addition, the evaluation also included a side-by-side comparison of the 
two ALPR systems.   
One of the key elements of the evaluation was the assessment of the optical character recognition 
(OCR) of the license plate and USDOT number.  Evaluators calculated an accuracy rate for each 
piece of equipment.  In order to take into account unique situations where the equipment would 
not be expected to accurately decode the information, some fail codes were labeled as 
“exceptions” and an adjusted accuracy rate was calculated.  For the ALPR, these situations 
included:  the absence of a license plate or the obstruction of the license plate (e.g., a wide load 
banner, etc.).  For the USDOTR, these situations included any scenario where the posted 
USDOT number did not meet the federal regulation.  In addition, adjusted accuracy rates were 
calculated for various weather and lighting conditions.  Post evaluation, vendors were given the 
opportunity to make improvements to their system and the adjusted accuracy rate was calculated 
again.       
ALPR/USDOT Perceptics HTS USDOT 
Accuracy 78.7% 71.8% 73.7%
Adjusted Accuracy 82.6% 75.5% 74.2%
Day, Clear Adjusted Accuracy 80.3% 74.1% 75.4%
Night, Clear Adjusted Accuracy 86.3% 76.3% 69.3%
Day, Rain Adjusted Accuracy 85.6% 80.0% 76.5%
Day, Snow Adjusted Accuracy 65.4% 55.6% 75.5%
Post Evaluation Adjusted Accuracy 85.2% 88.7% 76.0%
 
For the ALPRs, the most common understood reason for failure was due to license plates that 
were dirty, damaged, bent, or lacked retroreflectivity.  For the USDOTR, the most common 
failure  was that the USDOT number was not visible (or only partially visible) within the image.  
The ALPRs performed best in “Night, Clear” and “Day, Rain” conditions.  Accuracy rates for 
the ALPR systems were significantly lower during “Day, Snow” conditions.  The USDOTR 
performed best during “Day, Rain” conditions and had significantly lower accuracy rates during 
the “Night, Clear” conditions.  During the evaluation, the Perceptics ALPR outperformed the 
HTS ALPR in all conditions.  After the evaluation, the HTS ALPR improved drastically and 
outperformed the Perceptics ALPR.   
 
xi 
 
One significant problem that surfaced during the screening process was the quality of data used 
to make screening decisions.   Some of these problems originate during the data collection point, 
some at the point in which Kentucky (and other states) send data to the national clearinghouses, 
and in some cases when the data is pushed out to various servers used by individual states for 
their commercial vehicle screening systems. In general, this problem is more significant on the 
vehicle level than the carrier level.  The result is that the system will fail some vehicles on a 
particular screening element, only to have enforcement stop that vehicle and find there is no 
problem.     
With regard to the value of the system, during a 22-hour enforcement blitz, the screening system 
computer flagged 326 vehicles as potential violators. Of those 326 trucks/drivers, 72 were 
subjected to a Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 inspection. The enforcement detail issued 49 citations 
containing 65 charges, and found 62 safety violations. On an hourly basis, the system was 
flagging roughly 15 vehicles and generating three to four inspections per hour. The enforcement 
detail issued a citation, notice of safety violations, or both in 62 of 72 inspections.  
The safety and compliance violations uncovered by the system were consequential. There were 
62 safety violations, and 49 citations with 65 individual charges. As a result of the safety 
violations, six vehicles and one driver were placed out-of-service. There were also two trucks 
detained because of outstanding FOOS orders. The VOOS rate was 27.2 percent for the March 6 
blitz, and 43.8 percent during an earlier safety blitz on January 23. The average VOOS rate for 
the two blitzes was 34.2 percent, which is well above the national average.  As a result of the 
credentials and registration citations, $7,280 in fees, fines and back taxes were collected. Such 
outcomes may not be reflective of what users and researchers should expect out of the system on 
a daily basis. Staffing levels are not as high for daily operations as they are during special 
enforcement details. However, the potential of the system to augment safety and compliance 
screening performance outcomes is quite significant, particularly as the screening systems 
proliferate to other inspection stations across Kentucky. Total collections at the Boone County 
inspection station for calendar year 2011 were $20,628.87.  So, it is obvious that the system has 
the potential to significantly increase collections at Boone County and at any other inspection 
stations where the system is implemented. Subsequent years have seen an increase in collections 
as well ($29,620.73 in 2012 and $25,463.75 through September of 2013).  
The safety benefits of roadside inspections are difficult to quantify, but FMCSA officials 
estimated that 8,149 crashes, 5,206 injuries, and 276 lives were saved in FY2009 as a result of 
roadside inspection programs around the country. A screening tool that provides a VOOS that, 
when averaged, is 14 percent higher than the national average should substantially enhance these 
safety benefits. Another benefit is more efficient enforcement. The data showed that, when using 
this system, 65.8 percent of the Level 1 and 2 inspections identified safety violations.   
The results demonstrate the system’s most basic benefit – an automated screening process for 
virtually every truck passing through the station, with efficient identification of those carriers and 
vehicles most likely to have safety and compliance problems. Ultimately, the system provides 
tangible benefits to every stakeholder in the truck screening process. Enforcement officials reap 
the benefits of a highly specialized, automated ramp screening system that employs the latest 
technology and best available screening data. FMCSA benefits from enhanced safety screening. 
The increased VOOS rates and automated identification of FOOS carriers are vital for keeping 
unsafe carriers off the roads and preventing crashes, thus reducing the associated economic, 
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environmental, and human damage. The KYTC benefit from safety, credentials, and registration 
results, as the increased collections help bolster Kentucky’s Road Fund and pay for the state’s 
various surface transportation needs. The trucking industry benefits from increased safety and 
credentials compliance, as it reduces the number of non-compliant carriers and levels the playing 
field for carriers who do follow the statutory and regulatory requirements.  
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Chapter 1. Background and Introduction 
 
Kentucky has 14 fixed inspection stations around the state for enforcement of size and weight, 
safety, registration, and credentials related to commercial vehicles.  These stations are typically 
located on Kentucky’s interstates and parkways although two are on U.S. routes.  The stations 
are maintained by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) and staffed by the Kentucky 
State Police – Commercial Vehicle Enforcement (KSP-CVE) Division.  In 2011, there were 
more than 4.5 million trucks that passed through these stations.  All of these trucks were 
weighed, but only one percent of the trucks were inspected.  Much of the weighing is done with 
weigh-in-motion (WIM) equipment and can occur as the vehicle rolls through the station.  The 
inspections require an officer or inspector to stop the vehicle, perform the inspection, and 
complete the appropriate paperwork.  This typically takes anywhere from 30 minutes to 1 hour to 
complete, but can take much longer.  For this reason, along with limitations on the number of 
staff available at the stations, only a small percentage of commercial vehicles can be inspected at 
these locations.  That is why it is critical that KSP-CVE be able to electronically screen vehicles 
for inspection.   
1.1 Kentucky’s Current Screening Processes 
Kentucky utilizes mainline screening at 12 of their fixed stations.  This type of screening, 
however, is more about who is allowed to bypass rather than who is identified for inspection.  
Kentucky initially ran its own transponder-based electronic screening system, but now utilizes 
the PrePass system.  Trucks who receive a “green light” are allowed to bypass on the mainline, 
while trucks receiving a “red light” must pull into the inspection station.  There is currently no 
way to automatically stop these vehicles who have been given a red light by PrePass.  An officer 
or inspector would have to be monitoring the PrePass computer screen and manually stop these 
trucks for inspection.  Instead, these trucks are treated like every other truck once they enter the 
station.  Since not every vehicle has a transponder, this type of screening is voluntary; a carrier 
must sign up and choose to participate in this program.  As a result, only a small percentage of 
trucks can be screened in this manner. 
In order to screen all vehicles, a method must be considered that can identify all commercial 
vehicles.  The license plate and USDOT number are required to be displayed on all commercial 
vehicles.  The license plate must be displayed on the front of the tractor except for on intrastate, 
single-unit vehicles.  Kentucky allows these vehicles to display their license plate on the back of 
the unit.  The USDOT number must be displayed for all commercial vehicles operating in 
Kentucky as described in 49 CFR §390.21.  The identification number must be preceded by 
“USDOT” and must: 
 appear on both sides of the tractor; 
 be in letters that contrast sharply in color with the background on which the letters are 
placed; 
 be readily legible, during daylight hours, from a distance of 50 feet while the CMV is 
stationary; and 
 be kept and maintained in a manner that retains the legibility required as described above.  
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In the past, Kentucky’s fixed inspection stations relied on having a human observer available to 
read the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) number from the side of the 
vehicle for screening purposes.  A person would enter the USDOT number into the computer to 
determine if the carrier had any outstanding safety, registration, or credentials issues. (These 
vehicles would also be screened using their weight data.)  Due to staffing shortages, there are 
many times and many locations where no one is available to consistently perform this duty. As a 
result, a large percentage of trucks pass through Kentucky inspection stations without being 
screened against information provided by KYTC and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA). Even when enforcement personnel are present to read and enter 
USDOT numbers, it is a challenging task to read these numbers from a moving vehicle. At some 
inspection stations in Kentucky, there is a static scale lane between the enforcement personnel 
and the stream of trucks, thus making the task even more difficult. If a truck is on the static scale, 
it blocks the view of the passing trucks so that no USDOT numbers can be read. 
Manually screening the trucks as they pass the inspection station also makes it extremely 
difficult to identify the truck, make a decision, and signal the truck to stop before it heads back to 
the highway. If the truck is to be stopped, decisions and actions must be immediate. As a result, 
there are many occasions where enforcement personnel decide to stop a truck, but are unable to 
do so before the truck exits the station.  Because of these issues, an automated way to identify 
vehicles approaching the inspection station is needed. 
Kentucky first evaluated automatic license plate readers (ALPR) and USDOT number readers 
(USDOTR) with the implementation of the Integrated Safety and Security Enforcement System 
(ISSES) in 2005.  This system was primarily a radiation detection system but included ALPR 
and USDOTR to identify the vehicles. These technologies showed great promise for automating 
the identification process. However, these systems were never interfaced with any databases, so 
although they were capturing and decoding the license plate or USDOT numbers, ISSES was 
still unable to identify the vehicle.  Also, the ISSES equipment was located within 100 feet of the 
inspection station, so even if Kentucky chose to interface the system with the appropriate 
databases, it would be unlikely that the vehicle could be identified and stopped prior to exiting 
the station.  It became clear that an automated system within the inspection station was needed to 
efficiently identify and screen vehicles for inspection.   
1.2 Kentucky’s Screening Criteria 
In 1999, Kentucky entered into a grant agreement with the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) for the implementation of the Performance and Registration Information Systems 
Management (PRISM) program in Kentucky. PRISM links federal and state motor carrier safety 
information systems with the motor vehicle registration and licensing systems of the states. The 
PRISM program has two primary objectives: 1) determine the safety fitness of the motor carrier 
prior to issuing license plates, and 2) cause motor carriers to improve their safety performance 
through an improvement process. In cases where a carrier does not improve safety, the 
application of sanctions may be necessary. A key requirement for enforcement in PRISM states, 
like Kentucky, is to identify carriers and vehicles operating under a Federal Out-of-Service 
(FOOS) order and to identify those targeted by FMCSA for inspection.  Motor carriers with an 
FOOS order must cease interstate operations generally due to one of the following conditions:   
1) The motor carrier received a final unsatisfactory rating from FMCSA; 
2) After due process, the motor carrier fails to pay Federal fines levied from FMCSA; 
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3) The motor carrier is determined to be an imminent hazard; or 
4) A new entrant fails an audit or does not schedule one within 18 months. 
 
Those targeted for inspection are considered high-risk for a future crash as determined by the 
Safety Measurement System (SMS), which is the primary component of the Compliance, Safety, 
Accountability (CSA) program that was introduced in 2010.   
KSP-CVE also strives to enforce other commercial vehicle-related size and weight, safety, 
registration, and credentials regulations.  All oversize and overweight loads are directed to the 
static scale and typically must show a permit before exiting the station.  With regard to safety, 
KSP-CVE uses the company’s safety history from the Safety and Fitness Electronic Records 
(SAFER) database as an indicator of a potential safety problem.  Carriers with an unusually high 
vehicle, driver, or hazardous material out-of-service (OOS) rate are good candidates for 
inspection.  Registration and credentials information is taken from a variety of national and 
Kentucky databases including Kentucky’s Commercial Vehicle Information Exchange Window 
(CVIEW).  Using these sources of information, KSP-CVE can determine if the following 
registration or credentials problems exist: 
 Vehicle has expired registration; 
 Vehicle is not prorated for Kentucky; 
 Vehicle exceeds its registered weight; 
 Carrier has a revoked International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA) (from any state) or a 
suspended IFTA from Kentucky; 
 Carrier has a revoked or suspended Interstate Common Carrier (ICC) Exempt certificate; 
 Carrier has insufficient liability insurance; 
 Carrier has not paid previous and/or current year Unified Carrier Registration (UCR); and 
 Carrier does not have the appropriate Kentucky-specific credential or has one that has 
been revoked or suspended, such as the Kentucky Intrastate Tax (KIT), KY for Hire, or 
the Kentucky Highway Use (KYU). 
 
In 2010, Kentucky utilized PRISM and Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks 
(CVISN) federal grants to implement an automated ramp screening system at the Boone County 
inspection station. The PRISM program is a federal program administered by the FMCSA and is 
designed to improve the safety performance of carriers by targeting high-risk carriers for 
roadside inspections and potential sanctions if the company’s safety record does not improve.1 
The primary source of funding was PRISM and therefore the system became known as a 
PRISM-based Automated Ramp Screening System (PARSS).  However, the system incorporated 
all the PRISM and CVISN screening elements described in the previous paragraphs.  The 
Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) at the University of Kentucky was tasked with 
developing the system specifications, procuring the equipment and user interface software, 
overseeing the installation and construction of the system, working through technical issues, 
evaluating the performance of the system and the technologies, and developing criteria for wide 
                                                            
1 FMCSA. 2013. “Performance and Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) – Background.” 
Accessed 30 May 2013 at: https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/prism/prism.aspx 
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spread deployment of the system to other stations in Kentucky.  FMCSA’s PRISM team required 
that the system include a USDOTR and at least two ALPRs.  Both ALPRs would be utilized to 
capture the tractor plate on the front of the vehicle and the evaluation would need to include a 
comparison of the two ALPR systems.  From KYTC and KSP-CVE’s perspective, the system 
would hopefully address the screening challenges posed by staff shortages and time constraints 
at the Boone County inspection station.     
1.3 Content of the Report 
A description of the system, the findings of the evaluation, and lessons learned from the project 
are summarized in this report and organized as follows: 
 
 Chapter 2 includes a description of the system, when it was installed, maintenance 
requirements, site layout, system architecture, the system sequence, information about the 
screening data, the maintenance of the screening data and a description of the system’s 
utilization protocol.  
 
 Chapter 3 details the evaluation of the system, and includes an analysis of how well the 
system performed during various tasks. Researchers looked at whether the system 
captured images on every truck passing through the station, whether it properly decoded 
the license plate and USDOT number in the images, whether it correlated the data 
correctly for every commercial vehicle (i.e. links license plate, USDOT number and 
weight data), whether it screened against the appropriate database and returned the 
expected result, whether it characterized problems correctly, how often manual 
corrections needed to be made to the USDOT number,  license plate number, or 
jurisdiction, the quality and usefulness of the user interface, proper integration with the 
inspection station signage and how the system stored observations for audit purposes. 
Chapter 3 also provides a side-by-side comparison of ALPR cameras, includes a 
description of the different specifications for the two camera systems, compares the 
effectiveness of each system in capturing the full license plate image for each commercial 
vehicle, the percentage of properly decoded character strings for each commercial vehicle 
license plate or USDOT decal, and the percentage of vehicles for which the correct 
jurisdiction is also identified. 
 
 Chapter 4 details another component of the system evaluation and includes an 
examination of the potential safety violation code outputs to analyze the benefits of the 
system for commercial vehicle safety and enforcement. The safety benefits from 
identifying carriers with a FOOS order, carriers in the PRISM target file or targeted for 
safety inspections, and trucks with high vehicle-out-of-service (VOOS) and driver-out-of-
service (DOOS) records. These warning “flags” were examined closely over three days 
of enforcement blitzes. During the blitzes, the level of inspection (Level 1, 2, or 3) and 
the final disposition of the stop were recorded to assess the effectiveness of particular 
safety flags. 
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 Chapter 5 delineates standards for widespread deployment developed based on the 
observations of researchers and officials during the development of the initial automated 
screening system at Boone County. These standards will address required staffing, 
inspection station characteristics (such as ramp length, location, static scale location, 
WIM attributes, etc.), the speed at which commercial vehicles bypass the station, 
equipment needs and maintenance requirements/costs.  This chapter also includes lessons 
learned from the implementation and evaluation of this project. 
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Chapter 2. System Description 
 
This project involved the specification, installation, integration, operation, and support of an 
automated PRISM-based screening system on the entrance ramp to the Boone County inspection 
station. The system was implemented by a committee comprised of officials with KSP-CVE, the 
Department of Vehicle Regulation (DVR), and Division of Motor Carriers (DMC). The installed 
system has the following components: 
 Two ALPR systems (one from Perceptics and one from Hi-Tech Solutions (HTS)) that 
provide the license plate number along with the state/jurisdiction from the front of the 
vehicle.  FMCSA’s PRISM team required the installation of two different ALPR systems 
for this project, to allow for a side-by-side comparison.   
 An automated USDOT number reader from HTS that provides the USDOT number from 
the side of the vehicle. 
 A scene camera (from Perceptics) to capture a digital image of each passing vehicle for 
general description and visual identification purposes. 
 An interface to the existing WIM and truck sorting and tracking system (from Mettler-
Toledo), which directs trucks targeted for inspection to park. 
 An automated screening database. The database is updated daily, using data from 
Kentucky’s Clearinghouse and CVIEW systems that contain the PRISM Target File. 
SAFER provides (via Kentucky’s CVIEW) the PRISM status and FOOS status of the 
motor carrier. The PRISM Target File provides the list of vehicles targeted for corrective 
action by the PRISM program.  Kentucky’s CVIEW is updated every ten minutes from 
SAFER.  
 The system is connected to a computer in the inspection station. An integrated user 
interface allows enforcement personnel to observe the system operation and to interact 
with the system as necessary.  
The system provides automated screening of trucks based on the license plate number and the 
USDOT number displayed on the vehicle. This automated screening checks the PRISM status of 
the carrier and vehicle and also checks to see if a FOOS order has been issued against the carrier.  
Safety history, credentials, and registration checks are also performed simultaneously. If it is 
determined that the vehicle should be stopped for inspection, that decision is communicated to 
the truck driver via the existing directional arrows that direct drivers to the static scale or to park 
and come in for inspection. This ensures that PRISM-targeted carriers and vehicles are not only 
identified, but are actually stopped for inspection. 
Trucks are screened against a local database that resides on a computer in the inspection station. 
While the system is designed to operate automatically, without the need for human intervention, 
it also allows enforcement personnel to monitor and interact with the system. Specifically, when 
license plate and USDOT number information is displayed, enforcement personnel have the 
ability to check the optical character recognition (OCR) results against photographs displayed on 
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the user interface and make on-the-fly corrections. If corrections are made on the user interface, 
the truck is rescreened based on the corrected data. The system is installed far enough back on 
the inspection station ramp to allow sufficient time for identification data to be displayed, 
reviewed, and corrected before the automated screening decision is made and communicated to 
the driver of the truck through the directional arrows of the existing truck sorting system. 
2.1 Boone County Inspection Station  
The system was installed at the Boone County inspection station which is located at the 
southbound 75 mile marker of I-71. The station is classified as a “superstation” because the 
station has a ramp WIM scale and sorting system, a large static scale capable of weighing the 
entire truck at once, and a truck rest haven with restrooms and vending. The inspection station 
faces oncoming traffic, with the bypass lane running between the station and the mainline, and 
the static scale lane on the opposite side as shown in Figure 1. This inspection station is typically 
open from 8:30 AM to 3:30 PM, Monday through Friday, and staffed by one to two officers 
although staffing shortages have had an impact on their ability to open the station. The Annual 
Average Daily Traffic (AADT) on I-71 southbound for 2012 was 16,763 vehicles per day, with 
roughly 29 percent commercial vehicle traffic. In 2011, Boone County had 221,939 trucks come 
through the inspection station and collected $20,628.87 in revenue from impounds. During 2011, 
there were 1,347 Level 1, 2, and 3 inspections conducted, with 645 (47.9 percent) of those 
inspections resulting in one or more violations. There were 6,744 commercial vehicle manual 
observations at the station, where a human observer keyed in the USDOT number and screened 
the vehicle against the Kentucky Clearinghouse. In 2011, KSP-CVE officials at Boone County 
collected $2,925 in temporary permit sales through the DMC.  
Figure 1. Overview of the Boone County Inspection Station  
 
(Image Source: Google Earth October-2011) 
Bypass Lane 
Static Scale Lane 
Inspection 
Station  
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In addition to the automated ramp screening system, the Boone County inspection station is 
equipped with the PrePass mainline screening system. Boone County and the Laurel County 
Northbound station on I-75 are the only inspection stations that are currently using this type of 
screening system on the ramp to automatically check PRISM status, FOOS orders, and Kentucky 
CVIEW records for safety, credentials, and weight violations.  
2.2 Installation and Layout 
The PARSS is comprised of two different image processing systems that work in unison to 
screen the commercial vehicles as they enter the ramp to the inspection station. One system is 
manufactured by Perceptics, LLC and the other system is produced by HTS. The Perceptics 
system consists of an ALPR and an overhead scene camera. The HTS system is comprised of an 
automatic USDOTR and an ALPR. A temporary installation of the Perceptics equipment was 
completed late July 2010.  Construction delays necessitated that the equipment be removed until 
power and communication services were provided.  The permanent installation of the Perceptics 
system occurred during the last week of October 2010.  Installation of the HTS equipment was 
delayed due to the Wireless Roadside Inspection System study that was performed in 
conjunction with FMCSA at the Boone County station.  Initial installation of the equipment 
began in February of 2011, but the system wasn’t accepted until September 2011.  At the time, 
HTS was new to this application for their camera equipment.  Additional time was required to 
ensure their equipment met the requirements of the project.       
Figure 2 is a diagram of the Boone County inspection station and the sorting and tracking 
system.  The sorting and tracking system uses overhead signage to direct trucks at several critical 
points. The in-ground inductive loops, which are buried in the traffic lanes, trigger various pieces 
of equipment when trucks cross over them. These inductive loops are powered by the detector 
and this creates a magnetic field.  The loops resonate at a constant frequency, which is monitored 
by the detector device. When a vehicle crosses over the loop, the resonating frequency changes 
from the base frequency to an increased frequency, and lets the system know that a vehicle is 
present.2 
 
                                                            
2 Marsh Products. 2000. “The Basics of Loop Vehicle Detection.” Accessed 2 April 2012 at: 
http://www.marshproducts.com/pdf/Inductive%20Loop%20Write%20up.pdf 
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Figure 2. Diagram of Boone County Inspection Station (Not to Scale) 
 
2.3 System Components 
The primary system components of interest include the Mettler-Toledo WIM scale and truck 
sorting system, Perceptics ALPR cameras and scene camera, HTS ALPR cameras and USDOTR, 
a desktop computer system, and screening software developed by Cadre5, LLC.  
2.3.1 Mettler-Toledo WIM System 
The Mettler-Toledo WIM system incorporates dual staggered weight sensors in the roadway and 
can accurately sense and weigh all vehicles entering the station. A calibration routine ensures the 
WIM accuracy by comparing static weights of randomly or purposely selected trucks to WIM 
results and automatically making needed adjustments.  The vehicle speed, axle configuration, as 
well as individual wheel, axle, and gross weights are measured by the system. The system can 
deliver this data to a local or remote data system for reporting, data analysis, and integration with 
other information systems.3  Figure 3 shows a truck about to cross the ramp WIM at the station. 
  
                                                            
3 Mettler -Toledo. “WIM (Weigh in Motion) Systems.” Accessed 2 May 2013 at: 
http://us.mt.com/us/en/home/products/Industrial_Weighing_Solutions/terminals_indicators/Term_And_Indicato
rs_Vehicle_Weighing/WIM_Industrial_Terminal.html 
WIM Scale
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Figure 3. Truck at the Ramp WIM 
 
2.3.2 Perceptics ALPR System 
The Perceptics ALPR cameras capture license plates on the front of the vehicles.  The system 
includes an inductive loop, which activates or triggers the system, a stroboscopic illuminator, a 
network video processor, and a scene camera. The power and Ethernet connections were 
provided by KYTC, as was the computer and software which makes use of the data collected by 
the system. Figure 4 shows the Perceptics equipment on the ramp at the Boone County 
inspection station. Table 1 details the equipment information for the cameras and stroboscopic 
illuminator. 
Figure 4. Perceptics ALPR System 
 
 
Scene 
ALPR 
Stroboscopic 
Illuminator 
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Table 1. Perceptics ALPR System 
Device Model QTY
ALPR camera IMG031 2 
Scene camera IMG030 1 
Stroboscopic illuminator IL003 1 
 
2.3.3 HTS ALPR and USDOTR System 
The HTS system, also known as the SeeUSDOT3 system, provides an additional set of ALPR 
cameras and a USDOTR camera. In the HTS system, the cameras are mounted on two separate 
polls on either side of the ramp, and the stroboscopic illuminators are contained in the same 
housing as the cameras for the ALPR system. Table 2 details the model number for the ALPR 
and USDOT cameras. Figure 5 displays an image of the system as mounted on the ramp and a 
close-up of an ALPR camera. 
Table 2. HTS ALPR and USDOTR System  
Device Model QTY
ALPR camera 2809225M20J 2 
USDOT camera 29B&W412J200X  2 
 
Figure 5. HTS USDOT, ALPR Camera Systems 
  
 
 
USDOTR ALPR 
 
13 
 
The SeeUSDOT3 Dual Pole ALPR reader is a turnkey system operating on a single lane, and 
includes the following elements: 
 Two USDOT imaging units encapsulating one megapixel, black & white, gigabit 
Ethernet cameras (GigE) cameras with White LED lighting – For capturing the USDOT 
codes located on the sides of the commercial motor vehicle. GigE cameras can transfer 
information at the rate of one gigabit per second. 
 Two ALPR cameras with integrated illumination – Used for viewing the front license 
plates. Illumination Options include: Infrared or Visible. 
 Lane PC running Microsoft Windows 7 Pro – for running the HTS software. 
 Software security dongle (HASP HL PRO) – for software security. 
 Two Network Interface Cards– Allows communication with the GigE cameras. 
 Input/Output Module – For the systems’ input and output. 
 Two ground loop controllers – For detecting the truck’s position and speed. 
 Digital Input/Output module to convert ground loop signals to TCP/IP communications 
protocol 
 TCP/IP communications protocol link (Network port) – For outputting the results via the 
network. 
 Computer cabinet/computer rack – For housing the lane computer. 
The SeeUSDOT3 system also includes the following software components: 
 SeeUSDOT3 – The main application. 
 SeeUSDOTViewer – The database viewer application. 
 Recognition DLLs – For recognizing the license plate and state jurisdiction. 
 Local MS-SQL database – For storing the recognition results. 
2.3.4 Screening Computer and Software 
The screening computer located inside the weigh station is a Dell workstation with a 24 inch 
monitor. Table 3 outlines the specifications of the screening computer.  The system is equipped 
with an APC Smart-UPS power backup to prevent interruptions to the power supply. The 
Kentucky PRISM screening software, which was written by Cadre5, is a web-based application 
that is accessed through the screening computer. The software allows remote access for approved 
users, and generates reports that are regularly distributed to members. These reports will be 
detailed in section 2.5.4. 
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Table 3. Screening System Computer Specifications 
Component Description 
Model Dell Precision T7500 Workstation 
Processor Dual Quad Core Intel Xeon Processors E5506 2.13GHz,4M L3, 4.8GT/s 
RAM 6GB, 1066MHz, DDR3 SDRAM, ECC (6 DIMMS) 
Hard Drive 500GB SATA 3.0Gb/s with NCQ and 16MB DataBurst Cache 
Operating 
System 
Windows® 7 Professional, No Media, 64-bit, English 
 
2.4 Sequence of Screening Events 
The following steps detail how the screening system screens and sorts the trucks. References are 
made to Figure 2 (station diagram) and Figure 6 (system architecture) when explaining the 
system sequence of events and functionality. The steps below correspond to the numbers 
displayed in Figure 6. 
1. As the truck approaches the station, the first loop (1A in Figure 2 and Figure 6) initiates 
the Mettler-Toledo system sorting system. When initiated, this system begins tracking the 
vehicle with its own internal tracking algorithm. 
 
2. When the commercial vehicle crosses loop 1B (see Figure 2 and Figure 6), it activates the 
Perceptics scene and ALPR cameras. The scene camera provides an overhead picture for 
general description and visual identification of the commercial vehicle. This image is sent 
to the screening computer as soon as it is captured. The ALPR cameras provide two 
pictures of the commercial vehicle’s license plate, which is then decoded by the system’s 
OCR technology. The license plate photos, OCR result, and confidence level (which 
measures how confident the system is that the image was successfully decoded based on 
the external parameters in the system) are all transmitted to the screening computer in the 
inspection station after the decode is completed (see Figure 6). 
 
3. Upon receiving data from the Perceptics cameras, the screening computer creates a 
unique identification number (ID), which is used to correlate data between the PARSS 
and Mettler-Toledo system, and then sends this unique identifier to the Mettler-Toledo 
system (see Figure 6).  
 
4. When the commercial vehicle crosses loop 1C (see Figure 2 and Figure 6), it initiates the 
HTS ALPR cameras. The cameras capture an image of the commercial vehicle’s license 
plate from each side of the ramp and decodes them using OCR technology. Although two 
images are captured, only one image is selected by the system and gets sent to the 
screening computer. The loop also initiates the USDOTR cameras.  
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5. When the commercial vehicle crosses loop 1D (see Figure 2 and Figure 6), the HTS 
USDOTR cameras capture images of the USDOT number from both sides of the ramp. 
The USDOT number is typically displayed in the form of a decal or painted on the sides 
of the truck cab. The characters from the USDOT number are also decoded with OCR 
technology. Even though multiple images are captured by the USDOTR cameras, only 
one USDOT number image is selected and sent to the screening computer. 
 
6. The HTS ALPR and USDOTR images, character strings, and confidence levels are 
packaged together and transmitted to the screening computer.  This information is 
correlated with the ALPR and Scene Camera images from Perceptics and the weight data 
from Mettler-Toledo.  
 
7. As the truck crosses the WIM scale (see Figure 2), the WIM system computes the gross 
vehicle weight, total vehicle length, number of axles, individual axle weights, and 
individual axle spacing. It stamps the date and time, affixes a system tracking number and 
any weight violation before sending the information to the screening computer.  
 
8. The screening computer compiles all of the data from the camera systems and WIM 
system into a single transaction record, and screens a local database (which is updated 
nightly) to determine whether there are any potential safety or credential violations for 
the particular carrier or vehicle. Since the screening computer receives two different 
license plate decodes, the one with the highest confidence level is used for screening. The 
KYU number, which is displayed on the side of the truck, can also be entered manually if 
it is visible in the photograph of the USDOT number. The potential screening violations 
are flagged and displayed on the screening computer graphical user interface. 
Enforcement personnel have an opportunity to make corrections (if needed) to the OCR 
results for the license plate or USDOT number.  If changes are entered based on the 
user’s recognition of an OCR error, the system rescreens the carrier or vehicle on the 
manually entered license plate number or USDOT number. The screening results yield 
the user one of four colored designations. Green signifies the vehicle and/or carrier is in 
good standing. Blue indicates a warning, which means there is no data against which to 
screen the particular truck, that the truck is registered to a state whose data is not trusted, 
or the system does not have a high enough confidence level in the screening results to 
notify the scale sorting system. Yellow means a screening violation has occurred but the 
enforcement personnel have chosen not to screen for that particular violation at that time. 
Red means a screening violation has occurred for an item the enforcement personnel have 
chosen to screen on at that particular time. When red is displayed, the scale sorting 
system is notified to direct the suspected violator to the static scale. The color 
designations are also represented in Table 5. 
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9. The screening system computer communicates a sort decision to the Mettler-Toledo 
system that directs the truck to the bypass lane or the static scale depending on the 
screening results. If the vehicle transaction record turns up a violation flag (red) before 
the split in the ramp for the static scale and bypass lane (22 on Figure 2), the vehicle is 
sent to the static scale so KSP-CVE personnel can investigate the problem further. If the 
screening produces a potential violation after a truck passes the split in the ramp, the 
truck is identified as a violator in the bypass lane, and can be directed to park from the 
bypass lane by the Mettler-Toledo system. KSP-CVE personnel still have the option to 
inspect trucks not flagged by PARSS and can hit the park button attached to the WIM 
system computer to park a truck that is in the bypass lane. If no violation flag is found, 
the truck is sorted to the bypass lane.  
 
10. The WIM system updates the station signage, which indicates that a driver is to bypass, 
go to the static scale or park (depending on the location of the signage – see the graphic 
representations in Figure 2). The WIM system tracks the vehicle to ensure the driver 
follows the signage commands. For example, a truck directed to the static scale would 
have the following loop sequence after going through the initial screening and WIM 
sensors: 22-3-5-9-24-23-14. If a truck is directed to the static scale but stays in the bypass 
lane, the sequence would be: 22-4-21-15. The WIM system would send an audible 
message to KSP-CVE personnel indicating a violator is in the bypass lane when the truck 
activates loop 4.  The truck is directed to park when loop 15 is activated (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 6. PARSS Architecture and Sequence 
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2.5 PARSS User Interface 
The following section describes the PARSS software and user interface. Several components of 
the software are discussed, including an overview of the main user interface, truck listing, the 
truck listing components, navigation controls, filtering options, search function, dashboard, 
inspection details, system settings, and administrative features. The software was developed by 
Cadre5 LLC and is browser-based and operated by double-clicking a shortcut on the screening 
computer desktop screen.   
2.5.1 Navigation 
Figure 7 is a screenshot of Kentucky’s PARSS user interface. There are four primary 
components that users need to understand in order to effectively use the system: Navigation, 
Filtering, Truck Listing, and Truck Details. Navigation is accomplished via the Go To button at 
the top left of the page. When clicked, a menu is presented with each of the available pages that 
may be accessed. Clicking an option in the menu will navigate the browser to that page.  
Table 4 displays the various options available under the navigation menu. The default screen is 
the Live View screen, which shows the details for live inspections of trucks being screened by the 
PARSS. Search provides a way for the user to access historical inspections as questions arise 
about the screening outcome. The Dashboard screen provides information on CVIEW updates, 
device status, and reports. Users who wish to tweak the screening levels and criteria can do so 
with the Levels screen. Administrative settings can be adjusted on the Admin screen. 
 
Figure 7. Kentucky PARSS Software  
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Table 4. Navigation Options 
Option Details 
Live View Main view for live inspections 
Search Search page for historical inspections 
Dashboard Provides information on CVIEW updates, device status, and reports 
Levels Configuration page for setting screening levels 
Admin Provides some administrative options 
 
2.5.2. Filtering 
The filter tool is used to filter the Truck Listing of current and incoming inspections, and has 
four main components: the Play/Pause button, time range selector, image type selector, and 
screening result filter. The first component is the Play/Pause button. It is used to pause or resume 
the flow of inspections coming into the Truck Listing. When paused, the browser will receive 
inspections from the server, but will cache them until the flow is resumed to ensure that no 
inspections are missed. Also, when paused, the button will flash as a reminder that the user 
interface is in a paused state. The next component is the time range selector, and it determines 
the length of time that inspections will remain in the Truck Listing before they are removed. This 
value is also utilized when the page is loaded or refreshed so that inspections that have been 
updated within the specified time will be populated in the Truck Listing. The third component is 
the image type selector, and it determines which image type is given display priority in the Truck 
Listing. The choices are to give priority to the license plate image or the truck (i.e. scene) image. 
This will change the view of inspections already in the listing as well as new incoming 
inspections. The final component is the screening result filter, and it determines which 
inspections are displayed in the Truck Listing at any given time.  
Changing the selection will update what inspections are shown in the list presently, as well as 
which new inspections are shown. Table 5 details what each selection means. Choosing ALL 
means all inspections will be listed. Choosing WARN means all inspections not given a “PASS” 
by the system will be displayed. Choosing FAULT will display only those inspections with a 
“FAULT” or “FAIL” tag. Choosing FAIL will only display those vehicles with a “FAIL” tag.  
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Table 5. Filter Selections 
 
Selection     
ALL 
    
WARN  
   
FAULT   
  
FAIL    
 
 
2.5.3 Search 
The search feature allows users to search for historical inspections. This function can be accessed 
by utilizing the navigation menu and selecting Search. The search page is similar to the main 
user interface, or Live View page, although there are a few distinctions: 
1) New or live inspections will not flow into this view. Only historical data will be 
displayed. 
2) The search filter box is present. 
3) The Filter does not include the Play/Pause selector, as it would not serve a purpose on a 
screen without live data flow. 
To search, use the search filter box in the upper right portion of the screen. Two options are 
presented (1) a search by date and time range, or (2) a search for a specific inspection 
identification number (ID). These two options may not be used simultaneously, and the second 
option will take precedence if both inputs are completed. When searching with a date and time 
range, the user may use a pop-up editor or manually enter the date and time range. Manual 
entries must adhere to the formatting requirements of the cell. When searching for a specific 
inspection, the ID of the inspection must be entered into the appropriate box. Clicking the Search 
button populates the Truck Listing on the left side of the screen.  
2.5.4 Dashboard 
The dashboard provides information on CVIEW updates, device status, and reports. It may be 
accessed by utilizing the navigation menu and selecting Dashboard.   
For each type of CVIEW file installed on the server, a corresponding entry is shown in the 
CVIEW Status section. The name of each file, along with details about the most recent time it 
ran, is shown. Details include the file name, date, time it was processed, the result of processing 
(success or failure), how many records were available to process, and a message about how 
many records were processed and how long it took. 
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For each component installed in the system, a corresponding entry is shown in the Device Status 
section. Information about each component is displayed, including its current connection status, 
time of the last communication with the device, and finally the time of the last observation 
generated from the device.  
The Reports section provides details about the reports generated by the system. Currently, there 
are four reports that are set to run automatically. These reports are the daily report, daily vehicle 
report, device report, and the observation report. These reports are emailed to those wishing to 
receive regularly copies of the reports. Specific reports for KSP-CVE personnel can also be built 
based on their needs. For each report, the report title is shown, in addition to the last date and 
time that the report was run, and a link to view the last report.  
The daily vehicle report lists all trucks identified with potential violations, the violation, and the 
inspection ID that can be used to look up the truck in the system and verify the screening results. 
The device report runs daily and shows the status of each piece of equipment located on the ramp 
along with the last observation and last communication with that piece of equipment. This report 
is useful in troubleshooting problems with the system. The daily report also runs daily and shows 
a summary for the previous 24 hours, 7 days, and 30 days. The report summarizes the number of 
inspections along with the number of potential violators under each screening criterion. This 
allows users to see how many trucks with particular types of violations are coming through the 
inspection station and whether or not they are coming through during certain hours, such as after 
the station is closed. The CVIEW update status report runs daily and shows whether or not the 
information from the Kentucky CVIEW was successfully uploaded to the screening system 
database. This allows users to know if they are screening against stale data or not. It should be 
noted that these reports are often unfiltered readouts that do not account for incorrect license 
plate and USDOT number decodes. These corrections depend on the availability of KSP-CVE 
officials to interact with the system, which is not always feasible due to staffing levels and the 
high volume of trucks being identified by the screening system. The observation report runs 
weekly and consists of observations recorded by the PARSS that are pushed to a server at the 
KTC. These observations are used by the DVR to see the activity at the Boone County inspection 
station. 
2.5.5 Screening Levels Configuration  
The screening levels configuration screen provides users with the ability to adjust screening 
levels for various screening criteria by adjusting system algorithms. It can be accessed by 
utilizing the navigation menu and selecting Levels. The values selected tell the system what 
screening level result to apply to a given inspection. There are three screening level choices that 
can be made: All, None or Percentage. Here is how those choices work: 
1) All means that for a screening rule where Pull Over All is selected, each inspection found 
to be in violation of this screening rule will be assigned a status of FAIL, and the sorting 
system will be requested to sort this truck to the static scale. 
2) None means if Pull Over None was selected for that same screening rule, and a violation 
occurred, a status of FAULT would be assigned, and no request would be sent to the 
sorting system. 
3) Percentage means if Pull Over Percentage was selected, and 50 was entered into the text 
box, then 50 percent of the trucks with violations would be assigned a status of FAIL, and 
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a request sent to the sorting system, and 50 percent of the trucks with violations would be 
assigned a status of FAULT, with no request sent to the sorting system. 
These options are available for each of the system’s 17 screening criteria. At the top of the 
screen, two quick override options are provided — (1) Pull Over All and (2) Pull Over None. 
Selecting one of the override options bypasses the selections made at the per-screening rule 
level. These are useful for quickly and easily dictating how many or which vehicles the PARSS 
sends to the static scale.  
Table 6 provides a listing of the available screening rules and their description. The first column 
designates the screening rule, or specific criterion of interest. The second column, labeled 
Description, designates the relevant screening question the corresponding screening criterion 
attempts to answer. The third column, or Basis column, designates whether information from the 
USDOTR or ALPR is used to make a particular screening decision. According to the chart, 13 of 
the 17 criteria are screened based on the USDOT number, which is designated for carrier-level 
information. The four remaining criteria use ALPR data, which enables vehicle-specific 
screening. 
Table 7 reports the data source for each screening criterion used by the screening system. Most 
of the screening data comes from SAFER which is maintained by FMCSA. The rest of the data 
generally comes from the Kentucky Clearinghouse system, with the exception of the IFTA data. 
These processes can be somewhat complex and distinct even if the data ultimately comes from 
the same source. For the sake of simplicity, only basic data sources are listed here.  
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Table 6. System Screening Rules 
Screening Rule Description Basis 
All OOS Percentage All OOS is the highest of Driver, Vehicle, or Hazmat 
OOS scores. Does this USDOT number exceed the All 
OOS Percentage threshold of 75 percent? 
USDOT 
Driver OOS 
Percentage 
Are the drivers for this USDOT number placed out of 
service more than 15 percent of the time which is 
almost 3 times the national average?  
USDOT 
Vehicle OOS 
Percentage 
Are the vehicles for this USDOT number placed out of 
service more than 75 percent of the time which is over 
3 times greater than the national average of 20 
percent?  
USDOT 
Federal OOS Does this USDOT number have a MCSIP level which is 
Federal Out of Service? MCSIP levels 54-63 
USDOT 
Hazmat OOS 
Percentage 
Does the company associated with this USDOT 
number get placed out of service more than 75 percent 
of the time which is 15 times greater than the national 
average of 4.5 percent? Set very high because the 
system cannot differentiate a hazmat from a non-
hazmat load. 
USDOT 
Liability Insurance Does this USDOT number have a record of sufficient 
liability insurance? 
USDOT 
UCR Does this USDOT number have an unpaid previous or 
current year UCR? 
USDOT 
Safety Rating Does this USDOT number have an unsatisfactory 
safety rating? 
USDOT 
KIT Has the KIT status been suspended or revoked? USDOT 
KY HIRE Does this USDOT number have a KY HIRE status of 
inactive? 
USDOT 
KYU Is there an active KYU status, or has it been 
suspended or revoked? 
USDOT 
IFTA Is there an active IFTA status, or if it is a Kentucky 
carrier, has it been suspended or revoked? 
USDOT 
ICC Exempt Is there an active ICC Exempt status, or has it been 
suspended or revoked? 
USDOT 
PRISM Is this License Plate in the PRISM and targeted for 
roadside inspections? MCSIP levels 3 or 7 
ALPR 
Expired Registration Does this License Plate have an expired registration? ALPR 
KY Prorate Is KY a registered proration state? ALPR 
Registered Weight Is this truck over its registered weight? ALPR 
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Table 7. Screening Data Sources 
Screening Criterion Data Source 
All OOS Percentage SAFER 
Driver OOS 
Percentage 
SAFER 
Vehicle OOS 
Percentage 
SAFER 
Federal OOS SAFER 
Hazmat OOS 
Percentage 
SAFER 
Liability Insurance SAFER 
UCR SAFER 
Safety Rating SAFER 
KIT KY Clearinghouse 
KY HIRE KY Clearinghouse 
KYU KY Clearinghouse 
IFTA KY Clearinghouse/SAFER/IFTA Clearinghouse 
ICC Exempt KY Clearinghouse 
PRISM SAFER (PRISM Target File) 
Expired Registration SAFER 
KY Prorate SAFER 
Registered Weight SAFER 
 
2.5.6 Administrative Features 
The administration screen provides the capability to execute some administrative tasks and 
special functions of the system. It may be accessed by utilizing the navigation menu and 
selecting Admin. 
This PRISM data section provides the ability to initiate a system database update. Selecting the 
Remote SFTP option will use the existing configuration to connect to, download, and process any 
available updated files. Alternatively, a local file (or files) may be used by specifying the folder 
in which it is located. 
The user can also manually run a daily report of the vehicles identified at the station. Options 
include: 
1) View the last report 
2) FTP available files to the remote server 
3) Show report for date 
4) Run report for date 
View the last report works as the name implies and will allow the user to view the last 
Observation Report run by the system. Selecting the FTP available files to the remote server will 
use the existing configuration to connect to and deliver files manually to the remote server using 
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the file transfer protocol. Show report for date will show the report uploaded to the server in 
Frankfort for any given date and time entered. Run report for date records the results and 
prepares them to be sent offsite. This is only used when the scheduled process didn’t run on its 
own. 
The user can also manually run the daily report for a summation of the number of trucks that 
passed through the inspection station and the number of each type of violation identified by the 
system. Options are: 
1) View last report 
2) Resend last report 
3) Run report over specified date and time range, optionally emailing the results 
4) Run report for specified date, optionally emailing the results 
View the Last Report works as the name implies and will allow the user to view the last Daily 
Report run by the system. Selecting the Resend Last Report will allow the user to manually 
resend the last Daily Report run by the system. Run Daily Report for a specified date and time 
range will allow users to run multiple reports over a specified date and time period and provides 
the option to email the results or just view them on the screen. Run report for specified date will 
only allow the user to run the report for any single date and provides the option to email the 
results or view them on the monitor. These last two options would generally only be performed if 
the scheduled process did not run on its own. 
The user can manually run the daily vehicle report for a list of inspections that were found to be 
in violation of a screening rule. The options for this report are similar to the Daily Report. 
The ALPR Analyzation feature, when run, will dump images to the file system so that they may 
be analyzed for accuracy. A valid date and time range must be specified or selected from the pop 
up menu. Users can select to only look at the images that generated a fault (or yellow 
designation) in the PARSS, look at all of the images in the date and time range, and decide 
whether or not to include the images identified as having a potential expired registration. 
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Chapter 3.  System Performance 
 
A thorough evaluation was conducted to assess the performance of the system (does it do what it 
was intended to do), the value of the system in identifying a vehicle for inspection with PRISM 
or CVISN-related issues, and the potential for more widespread deployment of this type of 
screening system.  In addition, the evaluation would also need to include a side-by-side 
comparison of the two ALPR systems.  System performance is summarized in this chapter while 
information on the value of the system and potential for widespread deployment is summarized 
in Chapter 4.   
Data for this evaluation was collected in a number of ways.  Data collection began in October 
2012 and first consisted of simply observing the system on site and remotely through a remote 
desktop application.  Data being stored on the user interface in the inspection station was 
downloaded for analysis by KTC staff.  In addition, data was collected on-site during various 
enforcement blitz activities where KSP-CVE personnel utilized the system to make stops at the 
station.  The system integrator and equipment vendors were made aware of the scheduled 
activity.  Care was taken to make sure any changes to the system were noted as the evaluation 
proceeded.   
 
The evaluation of the performance of the system was based on whether the system worked as it 
was designed to work.  The system functionality is rather complex as described in Chapter 2, but 
for the purposes of the evaluation, the functionality was summarized in four basic categories: 
 
1) Data Collection - The system captures data on every truck, attempts to decode the 
identifying information, and correlates the data into a single transaction record. 
2) Screening - The data from the recorded transaction is screened using the database on the 
computer and the appropriate message is displayed on the user interface. 
3) Tracking/Interception of the Vehicle - The vehicle is directed to pull in or stop if the 
screening rule is on and a potential problem is identified.   
4) User Interaction - The user interface provides the ability to manually screen vehicles, 
provides access to historical data, and is easy to use and understand.    
 
3.1 Data Collection 
3.1.1 Data Capture 
The system captures data on every vehicle that drives across the ramp WIM, including cars, with 
very few exceptions.  The system is always running and therefore captures data even when the 
station is closed. For a complete record to be established, the following data elements should be 
captured:  a license plate image (or images) from the vendors, a USDOT image from the vendor, 
an overhead image, a gross weight, and a transponder ID number (when a compatible 
transponder is present and functioning on the vehicle).  The ALPR and USDOTR will also 
attempt to decode the license plate and USDOT numbers using OCR.  All of this data is 
correlated together as a single transaction record for the vehicle. 
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Table 8 shows a summary of images reviewed from three enforcement blitzes held on January 
23, January 30, and March 6 and 7.  The column entitled “Total Images” shows the total number 
of images that were reviewed on that date.  This is not equivalent to all images captured on that 
date but is only the total images reviewed and is meant to be a representative sample from the 
day.  The column, “Missing Data”, is the sum of missing data for the Perceptics ALPR, HTS 
ALPR, and HTS USDOTR. Overall, the system only missed an image 0.29 percent of the time 
and captured the images 99.71 percent of the time.      
Table 8. Data Capture Rate During Screening Blitzes 
Date Total Images Missing Data % Missing % Data Capture 
1/23/2013 1004 21 0.70 99.30 
1/30/2013 506 1 0.07 99.03 
3/6/2013-3/7/2013 1778 7 0.13 99.87 
All 3288 29 0.29 99.71 
 
As mentioned earlier, other elements of a complete vehicle record would include weight data and 
a transponder ID. A small sample (268 vehicles) were examined and it was determined that 
weight was captured 100 percent of the time.  Observation of the system both remotely and 
during enforcement blitz activities seems to support this finding.  The transponder ID would only 
be captured when the vehicle was using a compatible and functioning transponder on the vehicle.  
In order to test this element, the PrePass system was set to 100 percent pull-in.  This allowed for 
an increased number of transponder-equipped trucks to enter the inspection station and cross the 
ramp.  The list of PrePass trucks was then compared to the trucks going across the ramp with a 
transponder ID.  Ninety trucks were observed with a transponder, but the system only captured 
38 transponder IDs, or 42.2 percent. After this test, the transponder reader was found to not be 
functioning properly and was disconnected from the system.  KYTC made the decision to 
remove the transponder reader from the system based on two observations over the life of the 
project:  1) Since PrePass transponder ID numbers are not shared with FMCSA and state 
agencies, there is no way to access data using this identifier; and 2) Most other transponder ID 
numbers (non-PrePass) that were read were not found in the database or tied to the wrong 
vehicle.   
3.1.2 Accuracy of the OCR 
The system was assessed to see how often the character string and state/jurisdiction on each 
truck license plate and the USDOT number on the side of the vehicle could be decoded 
accurately. Although the system captured an image for virtually every truck that went through 
the station, these images sometimes had flaws which made it difficult for the system to 
accurately decode the license plate or USDOT number string.  Sometimes the image was not 
flawed but the license plate or the USDOT number was covered or had some problem making it 
very difficult or impossible to decode.  KTC developed a process to mark each image with a 
success code or fail code to identify the success rate and describe and quantify technical 
problems which caused system misreads. These codes were used to categorize each of the 
images sampled from the enforcement blitzes. 
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Table 9 provides a comprehensive list of those 28 codes, which are numbered 0 to 27. Success 
was coded as “0”, and all of the other failure codes were numbered 1 to 27 according to the types 
of problems detected by comparison of the image against the character string reported by the 
screening system. Each failure code is briefly described in the description column. The fail codes 
were tracked for each of the three systems, but as the “Type” column shows, some were 
exclusive to ALPR cameras, some to the USDOTR camera, while others applied to both types of 
equipment. Three of the failure codes (8, 17, and 18), noted in red font on the Table, were 
ultimately excluded from the total numbers and accuracy calculations.  Code 8 meant the vehicle 
was not a commercial vehicle.  This included KSP-CVE patrol cars or other private automobiles 
that entered the station.  These vehicles did not need to be screened and therefore would not 
count against the accuracy of the system.  Both codes 17 and 18 meant there was not enough 
information to determine whether the decode was accurate or not, or even if an image or decode 
was available for review for this particular vehicle.  Since the objective was to determine how 
well the system decoded the information, these records had to be discarded for this analysis as 
well.   
Table 10 displays the results of the sampled images from each of the enforcement blitzes, along 
with a total from all blitzes. The table reports the total number images used in the sample, 
successes, failures, and the percent success for the Perceptics ALPR, HTS ALPR, and HTS 
USDOTR. More than half the total data comes from the final March 6 and 7 blitz, and most of 
the rest come from the January 23 blitz. As such, those blitzes will be driving the totals to a 
much greater degree than the January 30 data. The combined accuracy rate for the three systems 
is somewhat higher for the January 30 data, which is possibly a function of weather variation and 
sample size. Overall, the Perceptics ALPR system consistently has the highest accuracy rate of 
the three systems, with a combined accuracy rate of 78.7 percent. The USDOTR system comes 
in second with a combined accuracy of 73.7 percent, and the HTS ALPR was third with 71.8 
percent. A sample of data was analyzed from the March 6 and 7 blitz to determine the likelihood 
of identifying either the license plate or the USDOT number with the screening system.  Data 
from the Perceptics ALPR and the HTS USDOTR were utilized.  A total of 1730 records were 
analyzed and 1,625, or 93.9 percent had a correctly identified license plate number and 
jurisdiction or a USDOT number.     
There are some situations that make the identifiers difficult if not impossible to read with the 
system.  In order to take into account these unique situations, some fail codes were labeled as 
“exceptions” and an adjusted accuracy rate was calculated. Table 11 lists these fail codes.  For 
the ALPR, the exceptions included two scenarios, one where the license plate was missing from 
the front of the vehicle and the other where it was obstructed from view.  For the USDOTR, 
exceptions included situations where the display of the USDOT did not meet the federal 
regulations.  For this study, those failures included:  a USDOT number that was rubbed off or 
damaged, the use of “USDOT” on a different line from the number itself, or the use of 
“U.S.D.O.T.”. Based on these exceptions, adjusted accuracy rates are presented in Table 12.  The 
Perceptics ALPR continued to perform with the highest accuracy rate, 82.6 percent.  The HTS 
ALPR was next with an adjusted accuracy rate of 75.5 percent, and the USDOTR had an 
adjusted accuracy rate of 74.2 percent. It should be noted, that both companies were given 
feedback on their systems and the opportunity to improve their accuracy rates.  This information 
is presented later in this Chapter.   
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Table 9. List of Success, Failure Screening System Codes  
# Description Type 
0 Success Either 
1 Image too dark Either 
2 Image too light Either 
3 Image is blurry or otherwise difficult to read. Either 
4 System misinterpreted one or more characters Either 
5 Reader missed a character Either 
6 Reader added a character Either 
7 Captured character string incorrectly assumed to be license plate, USDOT# Either 
8 Vehicle is not a commercial vehicle Either 
9 Partial Plate ALPR 
10 License plate not captured ALPR 
11 No plate in overview image/No plate on truck ALPR 
12 Incorrect state/jurisdiction ALPR 
13 License plate number visible and readable, but system failed to read ALPR 
14 Camera caught wrong plate, assumed it was license plate  ALPR 
15 Dirty, Damaged, or bent license plate or lack of retroreflectivity ALPR 
16 Decal or other obstruction on license plate (i.e. Oversized Load) ALPR 
17 Data is missing Either 
18 Unreadable Jurisdiction ALPR 
19 USDOT not visible USDOT
20 USDOT partially out of camera view USDOT
21 USDOT number visible and readable, but system failed to read USDOT
22 USDOT number in a difficult-to-read font or hand written USDOT
23 USDOT number too small USDOT
24 USDOT number on a curve of the truck USDOT
25 USDOT number rubbed off or damaged USDOT
26 USDOT number was on a different line than "USDOT" USDOT
27 USDOT' spelled 'U.S.D.O.T.' USDOT
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Table 10. Breakdown of Accuracy Rates by Equipment 
January 23 
ALPR/USDOT Perceptics HTS USDOT
Total Used 971 979 981
Successes 744 691 719
Fails 227 288 262
% Success 76.6% 70.6% 73.3%
January 30 
ALPR/USDOT Perceptics HTS USDOT
Total Used 500 500 500
Successes 421 384 380
Fails 85 124 122
% Success 84.2% 76.8% 76.0%
March 6 and 7 
ALPR/USDOT Perceptics HTS USDOT
Total Used 1,739 1,741 1,756
Successes 1,361 1,236 1,285
Fails 378 505 471
% Success 76.6% 71.0% 73.2%
Overall 
ALPR/USDOT Perceptics HTS USDOT
Total Used 3,210 3,220 3,237
Successes 2,526 2,311 2,384
Fails 690 917 855
% Success 78.7% 71.8% 73.7%
 
Table 11. Fail Codes Labeled as Exceptions 
# Description Type 
11 No plate in overview image/No plate on truck ALPR 
16 Decal or other obstruction on license plate (i.e. Oversized Load) ALPR 
25 USDOT number rubbed off or damaged USDOT 
26 USDOT number was on a different line than "USDOT" USDOT 
27 USDOT' spelled 'U.S.D.O.T.' USDOT 
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Table 12. Adjusted Accuracy Rates 
ALPR/USDOT Perceptics HTS USDOT 
Total Images 3,210 3,220 3,237 
Successes 2,526 2,311 2,384 
Exceptions 150 160 25 
Total (Removing Exceptions) 3,060 3,060 3,212 
Adjusted Accuracy Rate 82.6% 75.5% 74.2% 
 
For license plates, 17.8 percent of all failures could be attributed to fail code 11 or 16 (one of the 
exceptions).  The majority of exceptions were fail code 11 which noted there was no plate in the 
overview image or on the truck.  Approximately four percent of the commercial vehicles coming 
into the station that were a part of this analysis fell into this category.  Most of these are 
Kentucky intrastate, single-unit vehicles that are not required to display a license plate on the 
front of the vehicle.  Only a very small percentage of these vehicles were actually missing a 
license plate.  Table 12 displays the failures of the APLR by prevalence.  The most common 
reason for failure was that the system misinterpreted one or more characters (24.3 percent of the 
time).  There is no obvious reason for this failure, but in this situation the system attempted to 
read the plate and failed on one or more characters.  The next most prevalent failure was 
associated with dirty, damaged, bent license plates or those lacking retroreflectivity.  
Approximately five percent of the commercial vehicles coming through the station had a license 
plate in such poor condition that it was unreadable or barely readable by a human observer.  Two 
other prevalent failures were identification of the incorrect jurisdiction (code 12) and license 
plate visible and readable, but system failed to read (code 13).  Code 12 indicates that the plate 
string was correctly interpreted, but the state or jurisdiction was not.  Codes 13 gives no 
indication as to why the failure occurred only that the plate was deemed unreadable by the OCR 
and no decode was attempted.  Other failures occurring much less frequently are listed in Table 
13.     
Table 13.  ALPR Failures by Prevalence 
Fail 
Code 
Fail Description* Percentage 
of Failures 
4 System misinterpreted one or more characters 24.3 
15 Dirty, Damaged, or bent license plate or lack of retroreflectivity 18.3 
11 No plate in overview image/No plate on truck 14.8 
12 Incorrect state/jurisdiction 10.3 
13 License plate number visible and readable, but system failed to read 8.8 
5 Reader missed a character 4.1 
6 Reader added a character 3.0 
16 Decal or other obstruction on license plate (i.e. Oversized Load) 3.0 
10 License plate not captured 2.6 
7 Captured character string incorrectly assumed to be license plate, 
USDOT# 1.1 
*All other fail codes associated with the ALPR account for less than 1 percent of the failures.  
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For the USDOTR, less than three percent of all failures could be attributed to one of the fail 
codes noted as an exception (code 25, 26, or 27).  All of these were fail code 25 which noted the 
USDOT had been rubbed off or damaged in some way.  Table 13 displays the failures of the 
USDOTR by prevalence.  The most common reason for failure (50.9 percent of the time) was 
that the USDOT was not visible in the image.  This is largely due to the fact that the USDOT 
number can be anywhere on the side of the tractor.  USDOT numbers located very high or low 
on the tractor, or ones that are very close to the front or back of the tractor are easily missed by 
the system.  This may also be attributed to a lack of contrast between the side of the truck and the 
number.  This problem causes the system to be unable to locate the number. If fail code 20 is 
taken into consideration, 57.2 percent of the failures were due to the USDOT not being captured 
or only partially captured by the USDOTR.  The next most prevalent fail codes were 21 and 4.  
Code 21 indicates that a human observer could discern the number but the system did not attempt 
to decode the information.  Code 4 indicates that the system attempted to decode the information 
but simply failed with one or more numbers.  It’s understood from the vendors that character 
spacing and contrast between the side of the truck and the lettering causes difficulty for the 
systems.  Code 22 represented 6.7 percent of the failures and indicates that the font style was 
unusual or difficult to read or the number was hand written.  Codes 6 and 5 combined make up 
7.5 percent of all the failures and indicate that a character was added or missed for some reason 
that is not clear.  Other failures occurring much less frequently are listed in Table 14.       
Table 14. USDOTR Failures by Prevalence 
Fail 
Code 
Fail Description* Percentage 
of Failures 
19 USDOT not visible 50.9 
21 USDOT number visible and readable, but system failed to read 13.3 
4 System misinterpreted one or more characters 8.3 
22 USDOT number in a difficult-to-read font or hand written 6.7 
20 USDOT partially out of camera view 6.3 
6 Reader added a character 4.0 
5 Reader missed a character 3.5 
25 USDOT number rubbed off or damaged 2.9 
7 Camera caught a string of characters on the truck which it incorrectly 
assumed was the license plate or USDOT # 2.7 
*All other fail codes associated with the USDOTR account for less than 1 percent of the failures.  
3.1.2.1 Post Evaluation Accuracy Rates 
Once the evaluation ended, both vendors were provided with feedback on how their systems 
performed and given the opportunity to make adjustments. Data was taken from July 9 to see if 
any improvements could be seen with the accuracy rates.  Both vendors improved their accuracy 
rates with this feedback as displayed in Table 15.  The percent difference shows how the 
accuracy rate changed from the previously calculated accuracy rates in Tables 10 and 12.  While 
Perceptics, saw a 2 to 3 percent increase, HTS saw more than a 13 percent increase in accuracy 
rates.  The changes to the USDOTR were not completed by July 9 therefore the USDOTR data 
was taken from July 18, once the changes were implemented.  The USDOTR system also saw a 
slight improvement in the accuracy rate. 
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 Table 15.  Post Evaluation Accuracy Rates 
ALPR/USDOT Perceptics HTS USDOT
Total Images Used 884 872 504
Average Accuracy Rates 82.4% 85.2% 76.0%
Percent Difference +3.7 +13.4 +2.3
Adjusted Accuracy Rates 85.2% 88.7% 76.0%
Percent Difference +2.6 +13.3 +1.8
 
3.1.2.2 Effects of Weather and Lighting 
Table 16 shows the number of images reviewed and the adjusted accuracy rates for each system 
based on the weather and lighting conditions.  The first category, “Day, Clear”, indicates that the 
images reviewed were taken during full daylight hours (not during dawn or dusk) with clear 
weather conditions (no precipitation). The majority of the data collected and reviewed can be 
classified in this category.  The second category, “Night, Clear”, indicates that the images 
reviewed were taken during nighttime hours when it was completely dark with clear weather 
conditions (no precipitation).  The third category, “Day, Rain”, indicates the images reviewed 
were taken during full daylight hours (not during dawn or dusk) with light rain falling.  The 
fourth category, “Day, Snow” indicates the images reviewed were taken during full daylight 
hours (not during dawn or dusk) with snow falling or having recently fallen (where some plates 
were observed to be at least partially covered in snow).  For the Perceptics’ ALPR system, 
performance was best (86.3 percent) for the “Night, Clear” category.  Data from the “Day, Rain” 
category shows high accuracy rates also (85.6 percent).  “Day, Clear” data shows an accuracy 
rate of 80.3 percent which is slightly lower than the average adjusted accuracy rate calculated for 
the evaluation in Table 12.  The “Day, Snow” data shows a significant drop in accuracy with 
65.4 percent.  For the HTS ALPR system, the “Day, Rain” category has the highest accuracy rate 
(80.0 percent).  The “Night, Clear” data has the next highest accuracy at 76.3 percent.  “Day, 
Clear” data shows an accuracy rate of 74.1 percent which is lower than the average adjusted rate 
calculated for the HTS ALPR in Table 12.  Like the Perceptics ALPR, a significant drop in 
accuracy is seen with the “Day, Snow” data (55.6 percent).  Based on this data, it appears low 
lighting conditions (either at night or overcast conditions) have a positive effect on the ALPR 
systems.  This is most likely due to the use of retroreflective license plates and infrared lighting 
by the systems.  Both ALPR systems had the lowest accuracy rates during the “Day, Snow” 
category.  This seems to primarily be because the snow would stick to the license plate becoming 
an obstruction for the APLR systems.  For the USDOTR system, the best accuracy rates are 
noted during the “Day, Rain” category.  “Day, Snow” and “Day, Clear” have nearly identical 
accuracy rates, which seems to indicate light snow has little to no effect on the accuracy rates of 
the USDOTR system.  The lowest accuracy rates for the USDOTR system were noted during the 
“Night, Clear” period.  Poor lighting conditions led to a decrease in accuracy of 7 to 8 percent for 
the USDOTR system.   
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Table 16. Images Reviewed and Adjusted Accuracy Rates by Weather and 
Lighting 
Conditions Perceptics HTS USDOT 
Day, Clear 2001 80.3% 2012 74.1% 2020 75.4% 
Night, Clear 710 86.3% 709 76.3% 717 69.3% 
Day, Rain 500 85.6% 500 80.0% 500 76.5% 
Day, Snow 496 65.4% 496 55.6% 499 75.5% 
 
3.1.2.3 Side by Side Comparison of ALPR 
Two ALPR systems were installed side-by-side for this study to compare their performance.  
Although the two companies approached the task a little differently, both camera systems were 
pointed at the front of the truck to capture the front license plate and decode the plate string and 
jurisdiction.  The Perceptics system was installed first and as of the release of this report, 
continues to be operational.  Perceptics utilized two ALPR cameras for the task in order to get a 
wider field of view of the front of the vehicle.  There was no integrated lighting with the 
cameras, but a stroboscopic illuminator was utilized to provide filtered light.  Perceptics 
provided quarterly preventative maintenance, which included cleaning of the lens and inspection 
of the equipment from installation through the evaluation period.  The only physical change to 
the original system was the replacement of a bulb on the illuminator.  Upgrades to the software 
were necessary to optimize the accuracy of the system. The HTS system was installed a few 
months after the Perceptics system and also continues to be operational as of the release of this 
report.  HTS also installed two cameras to increase their accuracy rates.  HTS cameras have 
integrated lighting with their ALPR cameras.  One camera was using infrared and the other white 
lighting.  The camera with infrared lighting was replaced after the evaluation because it was not 
working properly.  White lighting is currently all that is utilized with the HTS cameras.  HTS 
does not perform regular preventative maintenance, but comes out as requested if problems are 
reported.  Prior to the evaluation, no hardware changes were made, but software changes were 
made to optimize the system.   
Table 17 displays the various accuracy rates and the percent difference of the accuracy rates 
between the two vendors.  The first is the average of all conditions and the second is the adjusted 
average taking into consideration some exceptions as noted in Table 11.  Both systems are also 
compared by the lighting condition and weather.  The Perceptics ALPR outperformed the HTS 
ALPR in all evaluation period conditions by 5.6 to 10.0 percent.  The biggest difference in 
accuracy rates is shown with the nighttime and snow data where the Perceptics cameras 
performed 10 percent better than the HTS camera.  Both vendors were provided with feedback 
after the evaluation and given the opportunity to make adjustments.  The HTS system saw more 
than a 13 percent improvement in accuracy rates and outperformed the Perceptics system in this 
category by approximately 3 percent.   
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Table 17. Side-by-side Accuracy Rates by Vendor 
 Perceptics HTS 
Conditions % Accuracy % difference % Accuracy % difference 
Evaluation Period     
Average 78.7 +6.9 71.8 -6.9 
Average Adjusted 82.6 +7.1 75.5 -7.1 
Daylight Adjusted 80.3 +6.2 74.1 -6.2 
Nighttime Adjusted 86.3 +10.0 76.3 -10.0 
Rain Adjusted 85.6 +5.6 80.0 -5.6 
Snow Adjusted 65.4 +9.8 55.6 -9.8 
Post Evaluation      
Improved Average 82.4 -2.8 85.2 +2.8 
Improved Adjusted 85.2 -3.5 88.7 +3.5 
 
3.1.3 Miscorrelations 
Data miscorrelation occurs whenever information (license plate, USDOT number and weight 
data) are incorrectly linked together by the screening system. When data miscorrelation occurs, 
information for a particular inspection will show up in an obviously incorrect manner in the 
Truck Details window. Typically there will be images from two distinct trucks, where USDOT 
number, license plate information, and weight information clearly do not match. The correlation 
of this data is handled through the screening software and is based upon the time the data is 
received.  There is a window of time in which data is expected and then the window is closed to 
new data.  Correlation of the data is complicated by the fact that this screening system has data 
being supplied by two different vendors.  Even so, this problem occurred less than two percent of 
the time during the data collection period.   Researchers and enforcement officials have noticed 
this issue tends to happen most frequently whenever trucks get backed up on the ramp. When the 
trucks pass the ALPR and USDOTR equipment and go through the WIM sorting system at a 
lower rate of speed than usual, the system will sometimes erroneously assume two trucks closely 
spaced together is actually just one vehicle.  In those instances, information gets scrambled in 
one flawed inspection rather than completing two correctly, independently created inspections. 
ITERIS, who is under contract to complete work on subsequent screening systems, has 
implemented programming solutions to further reduce instances of data miscorrelation.  Future 
sites will also only have one image capture and processing vendor supplying data to the 
screening system, which will further eliminate correlation problems. 
3.2 Screening Data 
As noted in Chapter 2, commercial vehicles passing through the station are screened against data 
injected into the screening system, generically speaking, from the SAFER database and the 
Kentucky Clearinghouse. Every screening flag/category is screened against corresponding data 
from a single source. In this sense, the data is always screened correctly. However, the accuracy 
of such data is dependent on a multitude of factors, and various data quality issues have been 
identified which can lead to incorrectly characterized violations.  With general respect to data 
quality problems, some originate during the data collection point, some at the point in which 
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Kentucky (and other states) send data to the national clearinghouses (for SAFER, PRISM, 
International Registration Plan (IRP), IFTA, etc.) and in some cases when the data is pushed out 
to various servers used by individual states to configure their commercial vehicle screening 
systems. Data collection issues can be the result of data collection errors or inadequate collection 
of data. An example of the former would be an incorrectly entered USDOT number or license 
plate number. In an effort to combat this issue, Kentucky is transitioning from manually filed 
permitting and credential applications and tax returns to electronic filing. Automatically 
populating basic data fields from existing databases reduces duplicative data entry and reduces 
errors in commercial screening databases. The second type of problem requires changes in data 
collection policies. For example, registrant information is no longer collected, which leads to the 
screening system’s identification of potential KYU violators who are actually legal, but 
unbeknownst to KSP CVE officials are actually operating under the tax license of the leaser. 
Data uploading and downloading between state and federal entities, particularly for complex data 
such as the apportionment, weight and registration data that accompanies truck vehicle data for 
IRP carriers, can be problematic. Some states send more comprehensive vehicle information than 
others, which also creates inequities and data quality issues. Safety data from the PRISM target 
file is somewhat less susceptible to such problems, in large part because carrier-level data tends 
to be more complete than vehicle-level data. Data concerning OOS rates for drivers, vehicles, or 
hazmat carriers are obviously driver or vehicle specific in some cases, but safety data is 
essentially different in that vehicles are screened on tendencies to have an unsafe safety record 
rather than known credentials violations. Any calculation or tabulation of violation 
characterization accuracy has to be considered in context of these data issues. For more 
information on the value of the screening that occurred, refer to Chapter 4 of this report. 
After screening against the data, the system would categorize the vehicle record.  Those with a 
potential problem and targeted by enforcement should be marked in red.  Those with a potential 
problem but not targeted by enforcement should be marked in yellow.  Blue indicates that there 
was not enough information to screen the vehicle and green means that no problem was 
identified.  After observing the system for several hours on multiple occasions, there was no 
instance in which this categorizing did not work properly.   
3.3 Vehicle Tracking and Interception 
KSP-CVE officials have requested some changes in terms of the way the system is interfaced 
with the Mettler-Toledo sorting system. Officials want to change the way the sorting system 
handles trucks that have been sent to the static scale. Currently, those trucks are held for a period 
of roughly 30 seconds. If no action is taken by station officials, a default release mechanism 
kicks in, allowing the truck to exit the station. In cases of serious violations, such as a FOOS, 
KSP-CVE officials would like these trucks to be held at the static truck indefinitely until a 
manual decision can be made. In order to help facilitate greater awareness about the nature of a 
particular violation, officers would like a variable alarm tone system integrated with the sorting 
system which provides a distinct alarm for the various safety violations. In effect, this creates a 
three-signal system. The system would allow a bypass (for trucks with no issues or trucks the 
system was unable to screen), a static scale and release option (screened issue not deemed a top 
priority), and a static scale and hold option, which would hold screened trucks at the static scale 
indefinitely while sounding an alarm at a specified interval. 
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3.4 User Interface 
The PARSS user interface is quite intuitive and straightforward in terms of design. As noted in 
Section 2.5, the user interface includes an identifying banner at the top, a navigation button on 
the upper left side, a truck listing window which in a sense also functions as a navigation menu, 
and a content window which spans roughly two-thirds of the screen. The design includes plenty 
of white space to give each element separation and help it to stand out, and create balance for the 
web application.4 It appears to have the characteristics of a grid layout, with roughly two-thirds 
of the screen dedicated to content, which is in accordance with generally accepted design 
standards.5 The functionality of the system is rather limited, as the application itself has but one 
primary function. Users can change the settings specified in Section 2.5, enter license plate 
numbers, jurisdictions, USDOT numbers and (if applicable) transponder IDs. The user may also 
navigate the inspection history by filtering the inspection history. Generally speaking, the 
system’s user interface is fairly easy to learn and use, according to researcher interviews with 
commercial vehicle enforcement officials. During the initial evaluation phase, and during 
everyday usage, officials and researchers developed a list of proposed improvements to the 
current user interface to be included in future versions of the screening application. 
A list of the proposed issues and fixes includes: 
1. The application does not display the ISS score on the Truck Details view for each 
vehicle. Currently it is only on displayed in the Truck Listing pane. This should be added 
to the Truck Details window so that the information is easier to find.  
 
2. The Search function does not give users the ability to search by a particular USDOT 
number and license plate. Adding this functionality will make it easier to review past 
inspection files. 
 
3. The Truck Listing does not provide users information about where truck violations were 
not displayed because the confidence level from the USDOTR and ALPRs was too low. 
The suggested remedy is to highlight these cases in the Truck Listing pane. 
 
4. The FOOS warning device can be turned off in the software’s current format. KSP-CVE 
would like the flexibility to toggle this setting. 
 
5. The “Safety Rating” flag is based on stale data that has no screening value. The “All 
OOS” is essentially a combination of “HOOS” and “VOOS” flags, making it redundant 
and unnecessary. These flags need to be removed. 
 
6. KSP-CVE would like the ability to run reports by the USDOT number and license plate 
number, as well as fault type. The system is not currently setup to run reports in this 
manner. 
 
                                                            
4 Beaird, Jason. 2010. The Principles of Beautiful Web Design. 2nd ed. SitePoint: Canada. 
5 Ibid. 
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7. There is a bug with the screening system where user settings get set to default levels after 
a certain interval of time has passed. This needs to be addressed so that user changes to 
settings are appropriately preserved. 
 
8. The magnifying glass tool that is used to provide zoomed images of truck plates and 
decals needs to be rectangular in shape rather than circular. The end goal should be a 
magnification tool wide enough to provide the entire character string all at once, without 
having to scroll across the image. 
 
9. There is an option to toggle overhead images and plate images in the Truck Listing pane, 
but this option needs to be removed, as the plate images are of no value without 
magnification. The overhead images should be used, and there is no need for the other 
option. 
 
10. KTC researchers need to do more work to determine what reports are needed by KSP-
CVE officials, and which are not.  
 
11. Commercial vehicle enforcement officials are recommending the following 
reorganization of system flags: 
Safety  
FOOS 
DOOS Percentage 
VOOS Percentage 
HOOS Percentage 
PRISM (targeted for inspection) 
 
Credentials 
UCR 
Liability Insurance 
ICC Exempt 
IFTA 
KIT 
KY HIRE 
KYU 
 
Registration 
Ky Prorate 
Registered Weight 
Expired Registration 
 
Each screening criterion could be turned on or off by clicking the corresponding radio 
button. The system would be equipped so that each of these groups (Safety, Credentials, 
Registration) could be flipped on or off with a separate radio button for each group of 
criteria. 
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3.4.1 Manual Corrections  
The ability to manually key in corrections was included as part of the design of the user interface 
and appears to work properly.  A user may manually key in a license plate number, jurisdiction, 
or USDOT number, and the vehicle will be rescreened.  These strings are checked by the user, 
who can make use of the magnifying glass tool included in the user interface to check the license 
plate and USDOT number decals to make sure the information is correct. If a manual correction 
is entered, the truck is rescreened with the correct data. If this is done shortly after the vehicle 
appears on the user interface, the vehicle can easily be stopped before exiting the inspection 
station using the inspection tracking system and signage.  The system has been designed to track 
the number of manual data corrections made by users, which provides a useful metric with which 
to assess the success rate of the automated screening process. Table 18 provides the manual 
corrections data for the system during the enforcement blitz periods. The average manual 
corrections rate was 12.5 percent.   
Table 18. Manual Corrections for PARSS 
Date # Corrections Total Trucks Screened Correction Rate
1/23/2013 248 1,389 17.9
1/30/2013 279 1,876 14.9
3/6/2013 468 4,700 10.0
Total 995 7,965 12.5
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Chapter 4. System Outcomes 
 
This chapter presents the generated PARSS system outcomes from a 22 hour enforcement blitz, 
which occurred March 6-7 at the Boone County inspection station. The enforcement activity 
included researchers from KTC, KYTC officials, as well as KSP-CVE officers and inspectors. 
The primary enforcement objective was to test the system effectiveness in terms of correctly 
flagging registration, credential and safety violations. Specifically, the enforcement detail 
personnel enabled the following screening rules: FOOS, DOOS rate, VOOS rate, HOOS rate, 
PRISM, UCR, KYU, insurance, expired registration, IFTA, KY-for-hire, and registered weight. 
KTC officials monitored the ramp screening system to make sure it was functioning properly and 
recorded details about each vehicle given a FAIL flag (red designation) during the enforcement 
blitz. KSP-CVE officers and inspectors conducted inspections. KYTC officials answered 
permitting, credentialing and tax questions on-site. After the blitz, the KTC spreadsheet was 
compared with official KSP-CVE and KYTC records to assess screening outcomes detailed 
below. Table 19 shows the number of hours, total truck traffic passing through the scale, and the 
number of trucks passing through the scale during the blitz period. The “Day” column refers to 
the enforcement period occurring during normal station operation hours (8:00 AM-4:30 PM, 
although the blitz actually began at 10:00 AM). “Night refers to the rest of the blitz period, 
which occurred from 4:30 PM to 8:00 AM the following day. During the blitz, 4,700 trucks 
passed through the station. As expected, daytime traffic was slightly higher in terms of truck 
value when one compares the average trucks per hour for daytime activity with nighttime 
activity, although traffic through the station was generally constant during the blitz. Already the 
tremendous advantages of the system are apparent. Detailed truck counts are available. Virtually 
every truck going through the station is photographed and screened, with the system automating 
the vast majority of the WIM scale sorting decisions.  
Table 19. Blitz Hours and Truck Volumes 
Statistic Day Night Total 
Hours  6.5 15.5 22 
Total Truck Traffic 1,587 3,113 4,700
Trucks Per Hour 244 201 214 
4.1 Inspections 
Researchers recorded information about each truck stopped for an inspection, including the type 
of inspection to which the vehicle or driver was submitted. The FMCSA defines such an 
inspection as follows:  
A roadside inspection is an examination of individual commercial motor vehicles 
and drivers by a Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) inspector to 
determine if they are in compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations (FMCSRs) and/or Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs). Serious 
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violations result in the issuance of DOOS or VOOS orders. These violations must 
be corrected before the affected driver or vehicle can return to service.6 
All inspections conducted during the enforcement blitz were Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 
inspections.7 Level 1 inspections are the most comprehensive inspections, including a thorough 
driver and vehicle examination. Level 2 inspections include a driver inspection and a vehicle 
walk-around, which is slightly less comprehensive than the vehicle inspection protocol followed 
in a Level 1 inspection. Finally, there are Level 3 inspections, which are driver-only inspections.8 
Table 20 shows the number of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 inspections that were conducted at 
the Boone County inspection station during the March 6-7 blitz along with the 2012 totals for 
Kentucky. The distribution of each inspection type as a percentage of all inspections is reported 
in the second column. Most of the 17 Level 1 inspections, which constituted 23.6 percent of all 
inspections, occurred during the latter part of the blitz, largely because of personnel scheduling. 
Level 2 inspections represented the lowest percentage of overall inspections (6.9 percent). Most 
of the inspections (69.4 percent) conducted were Level 3 inspections, which were generally 
conducted as a follow-up to credential and registration screening. The third column reports total 
roadside inspections conducted in Kentucky in FY 2012.9 The distribution of blitz inspections is 
different than the latest available annual totals. Level 1 inspections constitute a larger percentage 
of the state inspection totals (34.6 percent) than the blitz total. Level 2 inspections, of which only 
five were conducted during the March blitz, actually constitute 28 percent of all state inspections 
in 2012. During the blitz there were more Level 3 inspections conducted than is typical given the 
statewide numbers. The difference is largely a product of having a large enforcement detail. 
Given the limited space for Level 1 and Level 2 inspections, several officers and inspectors 
focused primarily on Level 3 inspections.  
Table 20. Inspection Totals 
Level Blitz Total Blitz % 2012  Ky. Total  
 
2012 Ky. % 
1 17 23.6 36,690 34.6 
2 5 6.9 29,653 28.0 
3 50 69.4 39,563 37.4 
Total 72 99.9 105,906 100 
4.2 Daytime vs. Nighttime Operations 
One question the research team wanted to investigate was whether non-compliant trucks are 
more likely to pass through the inspection station at night. Screening vehicles at night is much 
easier with PARSS because it effectively collects visual information about every vehicle at times 
when a lack of daylight makes it difficult for human eyes to see USDOT and license plate 
numbers. The intuition was that non-compliant carriers are more likely to operate on main roads 
whenever they expect the inspection stations to be closed. The Boone County inspection station 
                                                            
6 FMCSA. 2013. “North American Standard Driver/Vehicle Inspection Levels.” Accessed 6 June 2013.  
7 No Level 4, Level 5, or Level 6 inspections were conducted as part of this enforcement detail.  
8 FMCSA. “North American Standard Driver/Vehicle Inspection Levels.”  
9 This would be the federal government’s fiscal year, which begins October 1, and not Kentucky’s, which begins July  
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is rarely open at night, so the blitz had the potential to be an interesting test case. Table 21 below 
breaks down the number of system FAIL codes recorded at the inspection station over the 22 
hour blitz period. Vehicles given no FAIL code by the screening system are those receiving a 
PASS, WARNING, or FAULT. Daytime FAILs totaled 77 – a rate of 14.1 per hour. Nighttime 
FAILs totaled 249, or 16.0 per hour. The ramp screening system vehicle fail rate was 5.8 percent 
during the day and 8.0 percent during nighttime hours. A chi2 test of the cross-tabulated data in 
Table 21 shows a small but statistically significant difference – trucks passing through the station 
during nighttime hours were more likely to be tagged with a FAIL code than those passing 
through during daytime hours. However, the results should be interpreted with caution. While it 
can be definitively said the differences are not owed to sampling error, it is possible that 
measurement bias is driving the difference. Given the USDOTR accuracy declined after dark, the 
reason that nighttime carriers are given FAILs at a higher rate could be explained by the greater 
frequency of USDOT misreads after dark. Staffing levels were also inconsistent from one shift to 
the next. This caused a skew in how the inspections were conducted. For example, almost all of 
the Level 1 inspections were conducted at night, so there was no way to compare vehicle 
inspections from daytime hours to nighttime hours. Furthermore, a large sample of actual 
inspections conducted during both time periods is probably necessary to conduct a detailed 
analysis. The question of whether non-complaint carriers are more likely to operate at night is a 
fascinating one, but no definitive conclusions on that question can be offered based on the data 
derived from this study. A more carefully planned research design is needed, as is a way to 
account for the daytime-nighttime difference in the accuracy of the ramp screening equipment.  
Table 21. Number of Vehicles Tagged with FAIL Codes During Day and at Night 
Screening 
Outcome 
Day Night Total 
FAIL 77 249 326 
No “FAIL” 1510 2864 4374 
Total 1587 3113 4700 
Chi2 = 16.125, Pr=0.000 
 
4.3 Screening Outcomes: Totals and Hourly Rates 
This section examines the totals and hourly rates for FAIL flags, inspections, citations, charges 
and violations. Inspections are the total number of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 inspections. 
Citations are documents issued for particular types of legal violations, and generally apply to 
credential and registration issues. Charges are specific violations of state and federal statutes or 
regulations enumerated in a citation. Some citations have only one charge; others have several 
charges. Citations are not generally issued for safety violations, but such violations are listed 
along with citable offenses in the Driver/Vehicle Examination Reports created in Aspen. This 
distinction is useful for legal reasons and research analysis because it makes tracking system 
performance for credentials, registration and safety easy to break down. Table 22 displays the 
total for FAIL flags, inspections, citations, charges and safety violations, along with an hourly 
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rate. As stated earlier, the screening system computer flagged 326 vehicles as potential violators. 
Of those 326 trucks/drivers, 72 were subject to a Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 inspection. The 
enforcement detail issued 49 citations containing 65 charges, and found 62 safety violations. On 
an hourly basis, the system flagged roughly 15 potential vehicles and generated about 3 to 4 
inspections per hour. On average, multiple citations and notices of safety violations were issued 
each hour. The enforcement detail issued a citation, notice of safety violations or both in 62 of 72 
inspections, which makes the citation/violation rate 86.1 percent. The research team was quite 
pleased with this result, because it means the screening system is quite accurately and efficiently 
directing enforcement officials to carriers with registration, credentialing or safety violations. It 
is also evidence that commercial screening performance can be significantly improved at 
inspection stations where the system is installed, as the citation/violation rate for the Boone 
County PARSS fares quite favorable to the pre-system citation/violation rate of 47.9 percent for 
FY 2011.     
Table 22. FAIL Flags, Inspections, Citations, Charges and Safety Violations 
Statistic Total Per Hour 
FAIL Flags 326 14.8 
Inspections 72 3.3 
Citations 49 2.2 
Charges 65 3.0 
Safety Violations 62 2.8 
4.4 Safety Enforcement 
The PARSS can effectively identify trucks with a high likelihood of safety violations. Most of 
the safety inspections were conducted on carriers in the PRISM target file, and carriers with a 
high DOOS or VOOS. During the blitz, 230 trucks were flagged with 247 potential safety 
problems by the system. If the screening process returned FAIL flags on those criteria they were 
automatically sent to the static scale and later inspected if there were available personnel. Table 
23 displays the number of safety violations by inspection level and the frequency distribution of 
safety violations. The vast majority of safety violations were uncovered by Level 1 inspections, 
which is as expected. Level 1 inspections are the most thorough, safety-oriented inspections. The 
five Level 2 inspections revealed only a single violation. Level 3 inspections revealed eight 
violations, all of them related to driver safety. The table indicates that only 27.8 percent of all 
inspections uncovered any safety violations. However, most of the inspections with no safety 
violations were Level 3, or driver-only, inspections. If the sample is limited to Level 1 and Level 
2 inspections, the data indicate that safety violations were documented in 14 of those 22 
inspections. The adjusted percentage of inspections with at least one safety violation would be 
63.6 percent. This is a more accurate way to assess the system’s success rate for safety 
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enforcement because vehicle enforcement officers focused on commercial vehicle safety would 
not conduct such a large percentage of Level 3 inspections.  
Table 23. Safety Violations by Inspection Level 
Inspection Level Violations Inspections 
w/Violations to Total 
Inspections
Percent of 
Inspections 
w/Violations
1 53 13/17 76.5 
2 1 1/5 20 
3 8 6/50 12 
Total 62 20/72 27.8 
 
Table 24 displays the safety violations discovered as a result of inspections conducted by the 
enforcement detail. The first column lists specific types of safety violations, which are 
alphabetized here. The descriptions correspond to violations outlined in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, although the specific citation codes are not displayed. The second column lists the 
total number of that specific violation type. The third column reports the number of those 
violations committed by carriers in the PRISM target file. The most common violation found 
was “Flat tire or, inadequate tire tread,” with 13 instances. Brake violations of various types were 
also quite common. They were not combined into a single category in the chart because officers 
used different violation codes when creating the Aspen Examination Report. Inspectors and 
officers also discovered five instances of logbook violations. All other violations were 
documented fewer than five times during the enforcement blitz.  The takeaway from this table is 
that identification of PRISM carriers is an extremely useful criterion for safety inspections, as 
61.3 percent of all safety violations reported were for vehicles in the PRISM target file. Because 
so many PRISM vehicles are identified by the system (there were 137 during the enforcement 
blitz), enforcement officials have identified a few shortcuts that help them decide whether or not 
to inspect a vehicle flagged as PRISM by the PARSS. The first step is to look at the truck to see 
whether it is a new model. Trucks that are less than two years old have few safety violations in 
the experience of commercial vehicle enforcement staff. A simple visual inspection of the 
vehicle from inside the station is also useful to this end. Second, they look up the carrier ISS 
score to see if they are considered good candidates for inspection. Third, if another vehicle from 
the same carrier has already been inspected and had no violations, officers and inspectors 
typically release the truck so they can inspect a vehicle belonging to a different carrier. 
Enforcement officials contend that inspecting multiple vehicles from the same carrier in one day 
creates a fairness issue from the trucking industry’s perspective, and generally does not result in 
the discovery of many safety violations. 
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Table 24. Detailed Safety Violations for All Vehicles and PRISM Carriers 
Description All PRISM 
ABS dash lamp failure 3 2 
Automatic airbrake adjustment system 
failure 
4 2 
Brakes out of adjustment 3 3 
Brakes out-of-service 4 2 
Defective ABS indicator lamp for trailer 2 2 
Discharged fire extinguisher 1 1 
Driver log violation 5 2 
Driving a CMV while CDL suspended 1 1 
Driving beyond driving limit, duty period 2 0 
Expired insurance 1 1 
Expired medical certificate 1 1 
Flat tire, inadequate tire tread 13 7 
Frame cracked 1 1 
Inadequate brakes, brakes out of 
adjustment 
11 5 
Inoperative brake axle 2 1 
Inoperative marker lamp 3 3 
Lamp malfunction 1 1 
No warning device 1 1 
Oil or grease leaking from hub 1 0 
Possessing license when privileges are 
revoked 
1 1 
Steering system arm loose 1 1 
Total 62 38 
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Another way to quantify the safety benefits is to monitor the VOOS and DOOS numbers and 
rates. These rates were tracked for the January 23 safety blitz in addition to the March 6 safety, 
credentials and registration blitz. Table 25 displays the VOOS and DOOS numbers and rates for 
both dates, along with the total and the average VOOS and DOOS percentage. In each instance, 
the VOOS rate is much higher than the national VOOS rate, which is 20.2 percent for FY 2012.10 
However, the DOOS rate for both blitzes is significantly lower than the national average, which 
is 4.9 percent. The reasons for the lack of DOOS outcomes are unknown, although the system 
did uncover several driver-related violations, which resulted in several notices of safety 
violations, and five charges on four citations.  It should be noted however, that this system does 
not identify driver-related problems; it only identifies companies with a history of driver-related 
problems.   
 
Table 25. VOOS and DOOS: Numbers and Rates 
Outcome Jan. 23 Jan. 23 % Mar. 6 Mar. 6 % Total Avg % 
VOOS 7 43.8 6 27.2 13 34.2 
DOOS 0 0 1 1.4 1 1.1 
 
Perhaps the most significant development is the system’s ability to identify carriers with a FOOS 
order. FOOS orders are issued to carriers that receive a final unsatisfactory safety rating, fail to 
pay federal fines levied by FMCSA, are determined to be an imminent hazard, or new entrants 
who fail to schedule an audit, or fail to pass an audit, within their first 18 months of operation.11 
During the blitz, two carriers were identified with a FOOS.  Carriers with a VOOS, DOOS, and 
particularly a FOOS order, represent a significant safety risk. PRISM carriers and carriers 
identified by the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) are significantly 
more likely to be involved in accidents than those who are not. Violators who do not improve 
safety standards or who are flagrantly non-compliant must face severe consequences in order for 
overall trucking industry safety to improve.12 The safety benefits of roadside inspections are 
difficult to quantify, but FMCSA officials estimated that 8,149 crashes, 5,206 injuries, and 276 
lives were saved in FY2009 as a result of roadside inspection programs around the country.13 A 
screening tool that provides a VOOS that, when averaged, is 14 percent higher than the national 
average should substantially enhance these safety benefits. Another benefit is more efficient 
                                                            
10 FMCSA. 2013. “Summary of Roadside Inspections.” Accessed 7 June 2013 at: 
http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SafetyProgram/RoadsideInspections.aspx 
11 FMCSA. 2013. “Federal Out-of-Service Orders.” Accessed 7 June 2013 at: http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-
security/PRISM/prism-MCSIP.aspx 
12 FMCSA. 2013. “Performance and Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) – Benefits.” Accessed 7 
June 2013 at: http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/prism/benefits.aspx 
13 FMCSA. 2009. “FMCSA Safety Program Effectiveness Measurement: Intervention Model Fiscal Year 2009.” 
Accessed 10 May 2013 at: http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/facts-
research/Intervention%20FY%202009%20Analysis%20Brief.pdf 
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enforcement. During the March 6 blitz, 14 of 22 Level 1 and Level 2 inspections revealed safety 
violations; during the January 23 blitz, 11 of 16 Level 1 and Level 2 inspections revealed safety 
violations. Collectively, the safety violation rate for these two blitzes (excluding Level 3 
inspections) is 65.8 percent. As enforcement performance improves, carriers may react with 
higher levels of compliance with safety laws and regulations, which is the ultimate goal of 
roadside inspections.   
4.5 Credentials and Registration Enforcement 
In addition to providing greatly enhanced safety screening, the screening process also allows 
enforcement officials to provide comprehensive enforcement of various federal and state 
registration and credentials requirements. The primary focus of the credential and screening 
process during the March 6 blitz was UCR, KYU, FOOS, Expired Registration, IFTA, and 
Overweight violations. Registration data quality issues make it difficult to screen trucks using 
decoded license plate strings. Technically the system functions according to design, but the data 
against which the system is screening is unreliable. During the blitz officials decided to disable 
the Expired Registration screening rule because a couple of trucks were stopped based on 
erroneous FAIL codes generated by the system. The UCR, KYU, Insurance, IFTA, KY-For-Hire 
and Registered Weight screening rules were turned on for the duration of the blitz.  
Citations and charges were tracked in order to assess the performance of the system’s screening 
and credentialing rules. In Table 26, the total charges are reported by inspection level. Also, the 
number of inspections with charges or citations (all inspections with a citation have at least one 
charge), along with the percentage of inspections where credential and registration citations were 
issued. Given that nearly all of these inspections where prompted by credential or registration 
FAIL codes, the percentage of inspections with citations can be viewed as a system success rate. 
Citations were issued to the driver in 49 of the 72 inspections conducted during the blitz – 
meaning 68.1 percent of the inspections resulted in at least one credentialing, registration or 
related charge. Should this performance rate hold up over time, enforcement personnel could 
expect to issue approximately two citations for every three inspections – assuming the system’s 
FAIL code was tied to violation of a registration or credentialing rule. Looking at the inspections 
by level, the success rate of the inspections is inverted compared to the success rate for safety 
violations, which is as expected because the type of screening rule failure influences the type of 
inspection performed by personnel. Level 3 inspections were generally performed when the 
vehicle had a registration or credential violation, but no safety issues. In 84 percent of those 
cases, a citation was issued, which indicates very efficient system performance.  
Table 26. Charges and Citations by Inspection Level 
Inspection Level Violations/Charges Inspections 
w/Citations to Total 
Inspections 
Percent of 
Inspections 
w/Citations 
1 7 3/17 17.5 
2 5 4/5 80 
3 53 42/50 84 
Total 65 49/72 68.1 
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Citations were issued for four of five Level 2 inspections, which translate to an 80 percent 
success rate. The reason for this success rate is probably a function specific to each Level 2 
inspection, which collectively form a very small sample. Level 1 inspections garnered the lowest 
success rate for credential and registration violations with 17.5 percent, but a lower registration 
and credential citation rate is expected for vehicles who are targeted for safety violations.  
The composition of credential and registration violations flags and citations provides researchers, 
transportation officials and enforcement personnel with information about the distribution of 
credentialing and registration violations. The PARSS flagged 122 vehicles with 138 potential 
credentialing and registration violations, meaning some vehicles had multiple FAIL flags. These 
credentialing and registration flags and charges are presented in Table 27.  Those flags, in order 
of frequency were: UCR and KYU, Overweight, Expired Registration, Insurance, FOOS, IFTA, 
and KY-for-Hire. Specific charges resulting from inspections, in order of frequency were: UCR, 
KYU, Overweight, FOOS, Expired Registration, and IFTA. There were no citations issued for 
Insurance or Ky-for-Hire during the blitz. Combined, UCR and KYU constituted 78 percent of 
screening and credential flags, and 79 percent of all cited violations (or charges). Overweight 
trucks comprise 8.7 percent of these screening flags. This particular number may be overstated 
because the WIM sometimes miscalculates the weight of trucks, and static scale weigh-ins reveal 
the truck is in fact running at a legal weight. Expired registration comes to 5.1 percent of the 
registration and credential flags, but readers should be cautioned again that this data is not 
always accurate and in several cases trucks with valid registrations were in fact incorrectly 
characterized as violations. This problem is not due to a failure of the USDOTR and ALPR 
equipment, but because several states do not provide comprehensive or up-to-date information to 
the SAFER database.  Insurance FAIL flags were issued on seven occasions. One violation 
notice was recorded but no citations or charges were written during the enforcement blitz, so this 
is not added to the official tally of citation charges. Precisely one IFTA flag and subsequent 
charge were recorded. In both instances where the system alerted the enforcement detail of a 
potential FOOS violation, the vehicle was pulled in, cited and put out of service. Both FOOS 
vehicles belonged to the same carrier. There were also six miscellaneous violations that did not 
violate any of the PARSS screening rules but could nonetheless be attributed directly to the 
decision to inspect the vehicle and/or driver.14 Both the system flags and the enforcement flags 
tell a similar story. UCR and KYU are by far the most prolific credentials violations. Overweight 
trucks provide a significant source of system attention, even if they do not always result in a 
citation. Other screening rules flags are less frequent, but no less significant in terms of 
importance (particularly FOOS).  
 
 
 
                                                            
14 The miscellaneous citations were issued for seat belt law violations (2), driving with a suspended license (1), 
possessing a license while a license was revoked (1), improper display of USDOT number and a driver’s logbook 
citation (1). 
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Table 27. Credentialing and Registration Flags and Charges  
Screening Rule Flags % of 
Flags 
Charges % of 
Charges 
UCR 54 39.1 27 41.5 
KYU 54 39.1 24 36.9 
Overweight 12 8.7 3 4.6 
FOOS 2 1.4 2 3.1 
Exp. Registration 7 5.1 2 3.1 
IFTA 1 0.7 1 1.5 
Insurance 7 5.1 1* 0.0 
KY-for-Hire 1 0.7 0 0.0 
Miscellaneous N/A N/A 6 9.2 
Total 138 100.0 65 100.0 
* Not technically a charge because no citation was issued 
One could divide the number of charges by the number of flags to calculate a success rate for 
each screening rule. However, this would be problematic for several reasons. First, some of the 
flags may be based on incorrectly read USDOT numbers or license plate numbers. Second, not 
all flagged vehicles were inspected because in many cases there were inspection station 
backlogs, and several flagged vehicles had to be released. There are other problems specific to a 
particular screening rule. Most of this would serve to downwardly bias the success rate statistics, 
and make it difficult to draw any conclusions. Therefore, the ratios were not calculated.  
4.5.1 Collections 
The revenue-generating potential of PARSS is also quite significant. Collections at the January 
30 registration and credentials blitz, and the March 6 combined safety, registration and 
credentials blitz were significantly higher than what is typically generated on an average day. 
The January 23 blitz generated $6,300 in fees, fines and taxes; the March 6 blitz generated 
$7,280 in fees, fines and taxes. The two-day collection total comes to $13,580, which helps 
KYTC and KSP-CVE cover the cost of providing both safety and credential-based enforcement. 
Given the collections totaled $20,628.87 for FY 2011 at the Boone County inspection station, the 
system has the potential to significantly increase collections at the Boone County station and 
other inspection stations where PARSS is implemented. Annual collections will depend on how 
many enforcement personnel are utilized at the Boone County inspection station, the amount of 
time the station remains open, the ability of KYTC officials and KTC researchers to address data 
quality issues with license plate data from other jurisdictions and the degree to which PARSS 
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training is emphasized by KYTC and KSP-CVE. From a research perspective, more long-term 
evaluation of the PARSS is needed so the financial benefit can be better quantified. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The systematic advantages of PARSS are numerous. During the March 6 blitz, detailed truck 
counts were collected, and virtually every truck passing through the station was photographed 
and screened. The system can also automate the vast majority of the WIM scale sorting decisions 
for enforcement personnel. Figure 8 illustrates this process by showing how the screening results 
translated into inspection results. The left-side legend shows how the PARSS categorized trucks 
passing through the station, with the raw number of vehicles in parentheses.  
Figure 8.  Results and Inspection Results 
 
Graphical representation of the 4,700 trucks passing through the station is shown in the orange 
doughnut chart. The vast majority of vehicles (93 percent) going through the station were given a 
PASS, WARNING or FAULT. The other seven percent were given FAILs. Most of those trucks 
were not inspected due to station capacity and personnel limits. However, two percent of the 
trucks (represented by the small blue sliver) were inspected. The arrow points from the FAIL, 
Inspected category to a detailed breakdown of the inspection results, which are represented by 
the blue doughnut graph. These categories are described by the right-side legend, with the raw 
numbers in parentheses. Of the 72 inspections conducted, only 10 (or 14 percent) resulted in no 
violations. More than half (58 percent) resulted in citations for credentialing or registration 
violations. Roughly 18 percent of inspections revealed safety violations, and 10 percent resulted 
in both safety violations and the issuance of a citation with credentials or registration charges.  
This means approximately 86 percent of inspections resulted in a valid safety violation, 
registration or credentialing citation, or both. It is also evident that commercial screening 
performance can be significantly improved at inspection stations where the system is installed, as 
the citation/violation rate for the Boone County PARSS compares quite favorable to the pre-
system citation/violation rate of 47.9 percent for FY 2011. The results demonstrate the system’s 
most basic benefit – an automated screening process for virtually every truck passing through the 
station and efficient identification of those carriers and vehicles most likely to have safety and 
compliance problems. It enhances nighttime screening to a degree never possible when officers 
and inspectors had only their eyes to identify and screen trucks without transponders. Most 
importantly, it eliminates labor-intensive keying or screening based on instincts, and identifies 
carriers with a high-probability of safety and compliance issues. The system does work best if 
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someone can monitor the decoded character strings based on the camera images, but these 
corrections require significantly less work than manually keying every truck coming through the 
station.  
The safety and compliance violations uncovered by the system were consequential. There were 
62 safety violations, and 49 citations with 65 individual charges. As a result of the safety 
violations, six vehicles and one driver were put out-of-service. There were also two trucks 
detained because there were outstanding FOOS orders. The VOOS rate was 27.2 percent for the 
March 6 blitz, and 43.8 percent during an earlier safety blitz on January 23. The average VOOS 
rate for the two blitzes is 34.2 percent, which is well above the national average.  As a result of 
the credentials and registration citations, $7,280 in fees, fines and back taxes were collected. 
Such outcomes may not be reflective of what users and researchers should expect out of the 
system on a daily basis. Staffing levels are never as high as they are during enforcement details. 
However, the potential of PARSS to augment safety and compliance screening performance 
outcomes is quite significant, particularly as the screening systems proliferate to other inspection 
stations across Kentucky. Given the collections totaled $20,628.87 for FY 2011 at the Boone 
County inspection station, the system has the potential to significantly increase collections at the 
Boone County station and other inspection stations where PARSS is implemented. 
Ultimately, PARSS provides tangible benefits to every stakeholder in the truck screening 
process. Enforcement officials reap the benefits of a highly specialized, automated ramp 
screening system that employs the latest technology and best available screening data. FMCSA 
benefits from enhanced safety screening. The increased VOOS rates and automated  
identification of FOOS carriers are vital for keeping unsafe carriers off the roads and preventing 
accidents, which cause substantial economic, environmental and human damage. FMCSA may 
also indirectly benefit from the technology transfer and diffusion of screening processes outlined 
in this report. The KYTC and transportation researchers benefit from safety and credentials and 
registration results, as the increased collections help bolster Kentucky’s Road Fund and pay for 
the state’s various surface transportation needs. Increased truck safety outcomes and revenue 
collections could benefit other states where automated ramp screening systems are implemented. 
The trucking industry benefits from increased safety and credentials compliance, as it reduces the 
number of non-compliant carriers and levels the playing field for carriers who do follow the 
statutory and regulatory requirements.  
The system also has lots of potential for future research projects. As these systems expand 
throughout Kentucky, researchers will investigate potential applications of other technologies, 
including equipment that can read the KYU tax license number in the same manner as a USDOT 
number. The state is in the process of building a centralized commercial vehicle inspection 
database that will be searchable for every ramp screening system across the state. This database 
will eventually be accessible at both fixed inspection stations and on laptops used by commercial 
vehicle enforcement officers. The data will be updated in real time at the fixed stations and daily 
downloads of canned data will be made available for use in enforcement vehicles without an 
internet connection for roadside or virtual inspection station enforcement purposes. As time 
progresses, research analysts will be able to investigate the impacts of these features as they are 
implemented. Long-term studies can be designed using the centralized inspection database. 
These studies can track system performance by examining the original reason the inspected 
vehicle was flagged by the system and the outcome of each inspection. These large-n, 
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quantitative studies will foster the development of predictive models that delineate the predicted 
probabilities of safety, registration or credentials violations (i.e. the expected enforcement 
outcomes). Estimates of safety benefits and collections outcomes for each PARSS installation 
can also be derived. At the micro level, models can show analysts how likely an inspector is to 
find a violation given a particular FAIL code by generating predicted probabilities. At the macro 
level, these models will be used to determine how many accidents, injuries, fatalities, and 
financial damage is mitigated by each system. Transportation researchers, commercial vehicle 
enforcement officers, state and federal agencies, and the trucking industry will likewise benefit 
from these future research endeavors.  
  
 
54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page intentionally left blank. 
  
 
55 
 
Chapter 5. Standards for Widespread Deployment 
 
Standards for widespread deployment have been developed by KTC researchers and KYTC 
officials, as the state intends to install more of these systems. This chapter briefly describes some 
of the considerations made by researchers and officials as they prioritize where to implement 
additional automated screening systems. 
5.1 Station Designation 
Kentucky currently has 14 fixed inspection stations, but not all of them have the same 
equipment, personnel, physical characteristics, truck traffic, or strategic importance (e.g. on an 
Interstate, at a port-of-entry, etc.). Some of the stations are characterized as “superstations” – 
meaning they have a WIM sorting system, large parking lots for trucks which may or may not 
include Truck Rest Havens, and larger inspection stations. Smaller stations have much shorter 
ramps and do not have the ability to sort the truck traffic. As such, Kentucky’s “superstations” 
are the best candidates for PARSS implementation. Those stations are as follows: 
 Laurel County Northbound (I-75) - PARSS already installed 
 Laurel County Southbound (I-75) 
 Scott County (I-75) 
 Simpson County (I-65) 
 Henderson County (U.S. 41) 
 Boone County (I-71) - PARSS already installed 
 Kenton County (I-75) 
 Lyon County EB (I-24) 
 Lyon County WB (I-24) 
5.2 Ramp Length  
Timing is crucial for the workings of an automated screening system, because of the need to 
carefully calculate the placement of the screening cameras and loops in relation to the station so 
that the truck pictures can be transmitted and screened before the truck reaches the split between 
the bypass lane and the static scale lane. In the early stages of the deployment, vendors estimated 
it would take ten seconds to acquire, decode, transmit, and screen the data, which would have 
required posting much lower speed limits. HTS initially suggested that speed humps would need 
to be installed in order to give the USDOTR enough time to acquire, decode, and transmit the 
USDOT number to the inspection station. The technology has improved drastically in terms of 
data transmission time, ALPR and USDOT accuracy, and system processing speed. The time 
needed to take photos, screen trucks, and deliver a sort decision has been reduced to roughly four 
seconds, which makes installation much less problematic. The Boone County inspection station 
has a ramp length of 313 feet between the WIM scale and the split between the scale and bypass 
lanes. Given the performance of the system, the distance between the WIM scale and the ramp 
split could be established as a baseline. Stations with longer ramps between the WIM scale and 
the ramp split could be fitted with an automated screening system. Since the weight data is the 
last piece of information received by the system, stations with a shorter distance between the 
WIM scale and the ramp split would require testing by research engineers and vendors to see 
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whether the trucks can be screened in sufficient time to communicate the required course of 
action to the driver.  
5.3 Installation, Equipment and Maintenance Costs 
Installation costs can vary greatly depending on station characteristics and layout. When 
developing installation cost estimates, engineers must determine the costs of supplying power 
and communications capabilities to the automated screening equipment, assess the condition and 
location of the existing inductive loops, and assess the need and location for signs, guardrails and 
other safety equipment. This requires identifying existing power and communications lines to see 
how much, if any, trenching is needed to supply the necessary power and communications to the 
equipment located alongside the ramp. In some cases several hundred feet of power or fiber optic 
cable must be run in order to make the system functional. Wireless communication was 
investigated, but a suitable wireless modem with sufficient bandwidth to send the images from 
the ramp to the inspection station could not be found in 2010. Engineers will solicit bids from 
contractors in order to complete the electrical and communications work.  
Equipment costs are another component of this evaluation. Requests for bids are sent to vendors 
who can supply the necessary technology and expertise to implement the ALPR and USDOTR 
systems. The installation costs associated with each vendor’s product, along with its later 
performance and maintenance costs, are evaluated in context of overall PRISM goals. 
The ramp screening system requires a minimal amount of maintenance to ensure its 
functionality. Quarterly visits are required to clean the equipment, check its condition, and 
recalibrate it to ensure that it is operating at its fullest potential. These quarterly visits are only 
needed to maintain the camera systems that provide the license plate image, USDOT image, and 
the overhead image. The rest of the equipment comprising the system only requires maintenance 
on an as needed basis. The in-ground induction loops do not require regular maintenance unless 
the loop wire starts to become exposed and resealing becomes necessary.  On-going maintenance 
for this type of technology is extremely expensive and should be considered at the time of 
installation.   
5.4 Software Development 
The original software for the Boone County inspection station was written by programmers at 
Cadre5, but an updated version has been installed. The Kentucky CVISN team and KYTC’s 
Office of Information Technology worked with ITERIS to develop the Kentucky Automated 
Truck Screening (KATS) software and develop the observation database.  The goal is to provide 
a centralized database of all trucks observed at these facilities.  
5.5 Conclusions/Lessons Learned 
The use of OCR to automatically identify all vehicles within the weigh station for screening 
purposes has proven to be very effective. The technology certainly has its shortcomings, but is a 
good way to screen all commercial vehicles in the absence of a universal electronic identifier.  
Perhaps the most compelling reason to utilize this technology for identifying vehicles is that it 
does not require additional equipment on the vehicle.  However, the technology would be more 
effective if standards for the license plate and USDOT number were stricter.         
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Throughout the course of this project, it became evident that the USDOTR system was a more 
valuable screening tool than the ALPR system.  This is because there is limited screening data 
associated with the license plate, and what is available is often poor in quality.  Canadian 
provinces and several states are not currently uploading their vehicle data to SAFER.  Of those 
states that do upload vehicle-specific data, many have inaccurate information.  This has surfaced 
as KSP-CVE stops vehicles flagged with registration problems only to find their registration is 
valid.  The result is that these flags are often not utilized in order to minimize the number of 
“false positives” from the system.  It is also seen when the USDOT number associated with the 
license plate in the database does not match the USDOT number identified with the USDOTR.  
This may happen with an incorrect decode, but oftentimes this is a result of bad data within the 
database.  Without significant improvements with the vehicle-specific data, the registration flags 
will quickly become of little use within these systems.  On the other hand, data associated with 
the USDOT number is available for all U.S. and Canadian carriers.  So even though the 
USDOTR may not perform as well as the ALPR system, there is more value in the screening that 
occurs through the USDOT number.   
As mentioned previously, there is opportunity to drastically improve the accuracy of USDOTR 
systems through the strengthening of the federal regulation regarding the posting of the USDOT 
number (49 CFR §390.21).   The requirements are very “loose” with regard to the location, 
contrast of the lettering to the background, and font size and style of the USDOT number.  These 
very things are the leading causes of failures associated with the USDOTR system in this study.  
The location of the USDOT number may need to be specified within the regulation by its 
distance from the first axle of the truck and the height from the ground.  This would provide a 
much narrower window for the USDOT number and would make locating the number much 
simpler for a USDOTR system.  The contrast between the lettering and the background has to be 
significant in order for a USDOTR system to find the USDOT number.  It may be necessary to 
specific the color of the lettering and the background in order to ensure the contrast is sufficient.  
The font style and size of the lettering should also be very specific.  USDOTR system vendors 
should be consulted when these changes are made to ensure the changes will make the USDOT 
number more machine-readable.     
Although the ALPR systems may not be as valuable to the screening process as the USDOTR, 
they still provide value to the overall system.  When the USDOTR is unable to get the USDOT 
number (approximately 25 percent of the time), the ALPR may still allow screening to occur 
through the license plate.  The ALPR system also allows for vehicle-specific screening that 
cannot be done with a USDOTR alone.  As stated earlier, the vehicle-specific data needs 
significant improvements, but can still provide some value if enforcement is willing to deal with 
“false positives” from the system. Stricter requirements for the license plate would also improve 
accuracy rates for this equipment.  Kentucky currently does not require intrastate, single-unit 
trucks to place their license plate on the front of the vehicle.  A change to this requirement would 
allow Kentucky to screen these vehicles as well.  A unique plate string for each jurisdiction 
would also improve the ability of the system to identify the jurisdiction.  It was discovered 
during the course of the evaluation that some states share a very similar, if not identical, plate 
string. For instance, South Carolina and Illinois share the same format for their plate strings.  
They both have the letter P followed by six numbers (P######). The only difference is that the 
South Carolina plate has the jurisdiction on the top of the plate and apportioned at the bottom of 
the plate, while the Illinois plate has the jurisdiction on the bottom of the plate and apportioned at 
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the top. This creates confusion at times for the license plate reader and causes erroneous 
screening results.  
Purely from a volume perspective, the PRISM, DOOS, and VOOS flags were the most common 
safety-related potential problems identified by the system.  The UCR and KYU flags were the 
most common credential-related potential problem identified by the system.  However, some 
screening elements were considered to be more valuable due to their ability to remove an unsafe 
carrier from operation or to identify a legitimate credential problem.   The flags deemed most 
valuable by Kentucky were FOOS, VOOS, UCR, and KYU.     
The thresholds for screening certain elements such as DOOS, VOOS, HOOS, and All OOS were 
a moving target that took time to establish. These values were set to pull in trucks with OOS 
rates much higher than the national averages for each category, but the exact values have been 
tweaked over time to achieve the most desirable results. These values were adjusted by working 
with KSP-CVE to find the thresholds that produced the best results.  Since the evaluation, KSP-
CVE has identified an effective way to utilize the DOOS flag as well.  Trucks with a DOOS flag 
are sent to the static scale and enforcement staff takes a quick look at the driver’s log book.  If 
there are obvious problems, then the truck is stopped for inspection, if not, the driver is allowed 
to proceed out of the station.  This procedure has drastically improved the value of the DOOS 
flag within the PARSS. 
Collaborating with KSP-CVE proved to be very helpful in optimizing the PARSS. Valuable 
feedback was received to enhance the newest software and suggestions for future enhancements 
to the system. Many of the changes that have been made to the system during this time period are 
a result of the officers and inspectors working with the system on a daily basis and providing 
feedback about what needed to be changed. One of the suggested enhancements is to integrate 
the PARSS with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database and also look at trailer 
license plates. Another suggestion was to make a change to the Mettler-Toledo sorting and 
tracking system to provide the ability to hold commercial vehicles with certain potential 
violations indefinitely. At the time of this report, vehicles are only held indefinitely if they are 
overweight. Therefore, a vehicle with a FOOS order could be automatically released if they are 
not manually directed to park or stop at the static scale. 
Another lesson learned dealt with the importance of fresh data.  Currently the system updates 
once daily. This generally works well, but there are instances when a truck is stopped for a 
potential violation and it is discovered that the violation had been corrected earlier that day. The 
new software being developed will update the screening database every 15 minutes to eliminate 
these types of problems. 
The results of this study demonstrate the system’s most basic benefit – an automated screening 
process for virtually every truck passing through the station, with efficient identification of those 
carriers and vehicles most likely to have safety and compliance problems. Ultimately, the system 
provides tangible benefits to every stakeholder in the truck screening process. Enforcement 
officials reap the benefits of a highly specialized, automated ramp screening system that employs 
the latest technology and best available screening data. FMCSA benefits from enhanced safety 
screening. The increased VOOS rates and automated identification of FOOS carriers are vital for 
keeping unsafe carriers off the roads and preventing crashes, thus reducing the associated 
economic, environmental, and human damage. The KYTC benefit from safety, credentials, and 
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registration results, as the increased collections help bolster Kentucky’s Road Fund and pay for 
the state’s various surface transportation needs. The trucking industry benefits from increased 
safety and credentials compliance, as it reduces the number of non-compliant carriers and levels 
the playing field for carriers who do follow the statutory and regulatory requirements.  
 
 
